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$Mt xA ptafy 
ED CASSITY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, j 
vs. > Case No. 8794 
J. J. CASTAGNO, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS ARGUMENT 
RESPONDENT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Special Interrogatories and Verdict Thereon. 
The clerk of the trial court failed to include in the 
Kecord of Appeal, the special interrogatories propounded 
by the trial court to the jury, and the answers of the 
jury thereto. However, Appellant in his brief, at pages 
4, 5 and 6, has correctly transcribed and set forth said 
interrogatories and answers. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the original interrogatories and answers are not 
included in the Record of Appeal, the Respondent hereby 
approves of the action of Appellant in including the 
same in his brief, and does hereby adopt such action in 
lieu of the inclusion in the Record of Appeal of the 
original interrogatories and answers. 
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2. Plaintiffs Exhibit I. 
Attention is particularly invited to "P Ex I," which 
is a map upon which is delineated the respective owner-
ships of land of Appellant and Respondent involved in 
this action. The holdings of Respondent in this area 
which are of particular concern are as follows: 
(a) The "Exchange property" acquired by Respond-
ent by Patent, dated Dec. 30, 1953, from the 
United States of America, and delineated upon 
said exhibit in pink, bearing the numeral ' 5 " ; 
(b) The "Homestead property" acquired by Re-
spondent by Patent, dated February 6, 1939, 
from the United States of America, and de-
lineated upon said exhibit in pink, bearing the 
numeral "3." 
Upon UP Ex I" is shown a lead pencil line com-
mencing on the North boundary line of Section 23, Town-
ship 2 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and 
extending in a Northwesterly direction across the "Ex-
change" property and "Homestead" property of Re-
spondent, and thence continuing in a Northwesterly 
direction to Stansbury Island. This lead pencil marking 
represents the so-called "Trailway" claimed by Appel-
lant. It was placed upon "P Ex I " by the Appellant 
at the trial (R. 67, 68, 69, 70). 
3. Supplemental Evidence 
For convenience, Respondent has included in the 
argumentative portion of this brief such supplemental 
evidence as he deems necessary for a proper determina-
tion of this case. 
2 
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Part A 
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT AND 
DEMONSTRATION OF VALIDITY OF JUDGMENT 
POINT I. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE LAND ACQUIRED BY DE-
FENDANT FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY 
PATENT DATED DECEMBER 30, 1953, AND RECORDED 
IN THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF TOOELE 
COUNTY ON FEBRUARY 15, 1954, IN BOOK 4 F OF DEEDS 
AT PAGE 229, THE PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO TRAIL-
WAY EASEMENT OVER SAME IN SPITE OF THE FIND-
INGS THAT THE PLAINTIFF AND HIS PREDECESSORS 
IN INTEREST HAD TRAILED CATTLE OVER AND ACROSS 
THE SAME FOR A PERIOD OF TWENTY YEARS PRIOR 
TO MAY 3, 1955, AND NEITHER DOES ANY PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY OR ROAD EXIST OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID 
LANDS. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Defendant acquired the fee simple title to land de-
lineated as "Pink 5" on Exhibit 1 by virtue of the Federal 
patent above described on Dec. 30, 1953 (E. 118). This 
land is particularly described as: 
Wy2 SWy4 and SE14 SW14, Sec. 4, Lots 6, 
7, Ey2 SWy4, Sec. 6, NWV4, SEy4, Wy2 NE%, 
SE% NEi/4, Sec. 9, SW14 SE%, NW% SW1^, 
Sec. 10; NW14, NWi/4 NE%, Ny2 SW*4, S W ^ 
SW%, Sec. 15; NW % NW% Sec. 15; NWV4 
NWy4, Sec. 22. 
(All of the foregoing is situate in Twp. 2 
South, Eange 5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian). 
SE% Sec. 1, Twp. 2 South, Eange 6 West, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Prior to the date of the patent the lands described therein 
were public domain owned by the United States of 
America. The so-called trailway to and from Stansbury 
3 
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Island passes over and across the land above described 
located in Twp. 2 South, Kange 5 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, with a compass direction from ap-
proximately the southeast to the northwest. The plain-
tiff definitely marked this position of this trailway on 
P -Ex. I and there is evidence that the trallway deviated 
from this course (R. 95). 
Plaintiff's evidence was directed towards establish-
ing a private trailway easement. I t was intended to 
support the allegations of plaintiff's supplemental com-
plaint which claimed a private prescriptive easement 
over defendant's lands as appurtenant to plaintiff's 
lands. I t is alleged: 
"Plaintiff's cattle have during said period of 
time trailed and crossed back and forth from the 
approximately 5,700 acres of land which plaintiff 
owns in said Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
to his other grazing lands located upon Stansbury 
Island and said use in crossing, trailing and mov-
ing almost continually over and across the lands 
by plaintiff and his predecessors in interest has 
been open, under an adverse claim of right, known 
and acquiesced in by defendant and his prede-
cessors in interest, and has created by prescrip-
tion an easement over and across all of said lands 
within the above described area which are nob 
owned by plaintiff, and which easement has be-
come and is now the property right of plaintiff 
in and to all said portions of land. That all of 
said use by plaintiff and his predecessors in inter-
est, have been an adverse use made with knowl-
edge at all times of the owner of said lands 
and without their consent and permission to said 
use being made." (Underscoring supplied) (Par t I 
of plaintiff's Firs t Cross Claim and Counter-
claim) 
4 
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There is no allegation in the Supplemental Com-
plaint and no evidence in the record which even suggests 
that plaintiff claimed that a public road existed over 
defendant's lands prior to the date of patent thereof 
in 1953. Plaintiff claimed by the allegations of his Sup-
plemental Complaint and his evidence was given to prove 
a private easement — not the existence of a public road. 
There was no interrogatory propounded to the jury con-
cerning the existence of a public road or highway. The 
pertinent interrogatories a re : 
"9. Do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors 
in ownership and possession drove or trailed their 
cattle across defendant's lands in going to and 
from Stansbury Island? (Answer yes or no). 
Answer: 'Yes.' 
"10. If your answer to No. 9 is yes, answer 
the following questions: 
A. Prior to May 3, 1955, did the plaintiff 
and his predecessors in ownership and 
possession regularly use the defendant's 
lands for that purpose for 20 consecutive 
years? (Answer yes or no). 
Answer: 'Yes.' 
B. Did the trail, if any, follow the same gen-
eral course and direction during the 20 
year period referred to in the next pre-
ceding question? 
Answer: 'Yes. ' " 
The Court followed the theory of plaintiff's supple-
mental complaint and of plaintiff's evidence in pro-
pounding these interrogatories, and submitted to the 
jury questions which pertained to facts relevant only 
to the question whether a private prescriptive trailway 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
easement appurtenant to plaintiff's lands as the domin-
ant tenement, had come into existence. There was no 
finding as to the existence of a pre-patent public high-
way or road over defendant's lands and neither did the 
Court ask for any such finding for two valid reasons: 
(a) plaintiff's supplemental complaint alleged no facts 
upon which such claim could be based, and (b) there 
is no evidence in the record supporting such claim. 
2. CITATION OF AUTHOEITIES. 
A. Private, prescriptive right in the Public 
Domain. 
"It is conceded that title to Appellants' land 
remained in the United States until December, 
1891. * * * This court has repeatedly held that 
a prescriptive right in, to and over real estate 
can be acquired only after an open, continuous 
and adverse user for a period of 20 years. # # * 
I t follows therefore that the time at which the 
respondents alleged prescriptive right commenced 
was in December 1891. This falls far short of 
the period of time required to entitle respond-
ent to a right of way over appellants' land by 
prescription, and he must therefore fail upon 
this ground." (Lund vs. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205; 
97 Pac. 33) 
"While there is no evidence in the record 
showing when the patent was issued by the United 
States in whom the original title was vested to 
respondent's land, yet their counsel in their brief, 
in referring to this subject at page 13, says: 
'The Murphys (respondents) land was patented 
in 1874.' We assume this to be the fact. If, there-
fore, no title passed from the government of the 
United States to that of private ownership in 
the year 1874, the right to acquire a private ease-
ment by user or prescription dates from that 
6 
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year. * * * If, therefore, we begin with the year 
1875 the twenty year period would end with the 
beginning of the year 1895." (Bolton v. Murphy, 
41 Utah 591; 127 Pac. 335) 
"It may be conceded that plaintiff is sup-
ported by the authorities in his contention that 
an easement by prescription cannot be acquired 
over land belonging to the State or the United 
States, (10 C.J. Sees. 23, 24, pg. 876). Such has 
been declared to be the law of this jurisdiction 
as applied to land belonging to the United States. 
(Bolton v. Murphy supra, Lund v. Wilcox supra). 
The title to a part of plaintiff's land over which 
the defendants claim the right to convey the 
water with which to irrigate their land was con-
veyed by the United States to E. W. Tripp, the 
predecessor of the plaintiff, in 1899. The title 
to the other land over which the defendants claim 
such right was conveyed by the State of Utah 
in 1913. I t will be thus seen that, if there was a 
break in defendants' use of the irrigating ditches 
across plaintiffs' land from 1907 to 1917 the de-
fendants could not acquire an easement by pre-
scription across plaintiffs' land because there 
could not be a continuous use for a period of 
20 years. As to the land conveyed to plaintiff 
by the State of Utah in 1913, obviously a pre-
scriptive easement could not be acquired up to 
1922 when this suit was begun." (Tripp v. Baglev, 
74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 912; 69 ALR 1417). 
"It is well established as the rule in Utah 
that the prescriptive period is twenty years as 
it was at the common law (citing Utah Supreme 
Court decision.) (Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 
22; 197 Pac. (2d) 117 at 122). 
B. Highways Over Public Lands. 
"The right of way for the construction of 
highways over public lands, not reserved for pub 
7 
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lie use, is hereby granted." (USES 2477; 43 USCA 
Sec. 932). 
"Highways are distinguished from private 
roads or ways in that the former are intended 
for the use of the public generally and are main-
tained at public expense, as already noted, while 
the latter are intended for the exclusive use and 
benefit of particular persons. Giving a private 
way a name does not make it a public highway 
or thoroufare." (25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 
4, pg. 340) 
"The term 'highway' is, however, used in both 
a broad and narrow sense. In its broad or general 
sense, it covers every common way for travel in 
any ordinary mode or by any ordinary means 
which the public has the right to use conditionally 
or unconditionally. * * * In a limited sense, howT-
ever, the term means a way for general travel 
which is wholly public. When appearing in a 
general law, it will ordinarily be regarded as 
having been used by the legislature in its general 
sense. * * *" (25 Am. Jur., Highways, Sec. 5, 
pg. 341) 
" / / a way is one over which the public have 
a general right of passage, it is in legal contem-
plation a highway, whether it be one owned by 
a private corporation or one owned by the govern-
ment, or a governmental corporation, and whether 
it be situated in a town or in the country. No 
matter whether it be established by prescription 
or by dedication, or under the rights of eminent 
domain, it is a highway if there is a general right 
to use it for travel. The mode of its creation does 
not of itself invariably determine its character: 
for this in general, is determined by the rights 
which the public have in it. (Underscoring sup-
plied) (Elliott, Roads and Streets, Vol. 1, Sec. 
3 , p g . 4 ) . 
8 
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"In order to constitute a particular road or 
highway a public road and the traffic and travel 
thereon subject to regulation and control by the 
Commission the question is not whether the county 
or state has acquired an indefeasible title, ease-
ment, or right of way, but the question is whether 
the particular road or highway is being used by 
the public generally for travel and traffic and is 
claimed by the public as a public road or high-
way, and as such is being used for the purpose 
of hauling and transporting freight and passen-
gers over it for hire or private gain by those 
owning and using the ordinary and usual vehicles 
used on public highways for such purpose. Any 
road or highway which is thus being used by the 
public generally is, in my judgment, a public 
road or highway within the purview of the law, 
over which the travel and traffic is subject to 
regulation by the Commission. (Emphasis sup-
plied.) (Justice Frick in Public Utilities Com-
mission v. Jones, 54 Utah 111, 179 Pac. 745) 
"The term 'public highway' in its broad, 
popular sense includes toll roads, — any road 
which the public have a right to use even condi-
tionally, though in a strict legal sense, it is 
restricted to roads which are wholly public." 
(Weirick vs. State, 140 Wis. 98, 121 NW 652, 
22 LRA (N.S.) 1221) 
"The word 'highway' as ordinarily used 
means a way over land open to the use of the 
general public without unreasonable distinction 
or discrimination, established in a mode by the 
laws of the State where located." (Lovelace v. 
Hightower, 50 N.M. 50; 168 Pac. (2nd) 50). 
"The federal statute involved is as follows: 
'The right of way for the construction of high-
ways over public lands, not reserved for public 
uses is hereby granted.' This is an offer to dedi-
9 
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cate any unreserved public lands for the con-
struction of highways to become effective # * *. 
It is a general rule that acceptance of an offered 
dedication of land for a highway may be estab-
lished by proof of affirmative acts of taking pos« 
session by public authorities or by general use 
by the public, provided the use is sufficient to 
constitute acceptance. (Citing authorities). The 
Supreme Court of the United States has said 
that such uses 'ought to be for such length of 
time that the public accommodation and private 
rights might be materially affected by an inter-
ruption of the enjoyment.'" (City of Cincinnati 
vs. White's Lessee, 6 Pet. 431, 8 L.Ed. 452. * * *. 
"The United States as a land owner has 
made an offer to dedicate unappropriated land for 
highways, if accepted as authorized by this state's 
law. The easement for its use as a public highway 
was created exactly as those (of which) the dedi-
cator was an individual land owner. If mere pub-
lic user is sufficient acceptance of an offered 
dedication, the ten year statute of limitations 
is not remotely applicable. * * * The courts of 
a majority of the states which have had the 
question for consideration have held that the 
general rules applies to the offered dedication of 
highways under the Federal statute involved here. 
(Citing authorities) (Lovelace v. Hightower, 
supra) 
"The cause of action upon which plaintiff 
prevailed herein upon a finding that the road is 
a public highway was not the same cause of action 
as the one in the former action which alleged his 
ownership of a private right of way. The proof 
that would have established one cause of action 
would not have established the other. The causes 
of action were in fact inconsistent, since defend-
ant could not have sold and plaintiff could not 
have purchased, a private right of way over a 
10 
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public road. Moreover, a different title was in-
volved in each case, the first a private title, and 
the other a title vested in the public. * * * The 
question of the public character of the road was 
not in issue in the first case and the issue was 
not tried. A decision either way as to the private 
right claimed would not have determined any 
question as to the public right." (Emphasis sup-
plied) (Ball v. Stephens, 68 Cal. App. 843, 158 
Pac. (2nd) 207). 
"The grant (K.S. 2477, 43 U S . CA 932, 
supra) is unconditional and contains no provision 
as to the manner of its acceptance. We think it 
quite well settled that when land is granted for 
a right of way for a public highway, the grant 
may be accepted by the public without action by 
the public authorities. The continued use of the 
road hy the public for such length of time and 
under such circumstances as to clearly indicate 
an intention on the part of the public to accept 
the grant has generally been held sufficient more 
especially so if it is made to appear that to inter-
rupt the use would "inconvenience the public/' 
It must be born in mind that it is not a question 
of the establishment of a highway by prescription 
which is here in question, but the acceptance of a 
grant; and therefore it does not depend so much 
on a definite length of time of use as upon the 
character of the use, taking into account the needs 
and convenience of the public, as manifesting an 
intention to accept the grant. (Emphasis sup-
plied) (Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 25 Wyo. 109, 
165 Pac. 518) (Cf: on rehearing, 25 Wyo. 416, 
171 Pac. 267) 
"A highway is a way open to the public at 
large, for travel or transportation, without dis-
tinction, discrimination or restriction, except such 
as is incident to regulations calculated to secure 
to the general public the largest practical benefit 
11 
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therefrom and enjoyment thereof. Its prime es-
sentials are the right of common enjoyment on 
the one hand and the duty of public maintenance 
on the other. It is the right of travel by all the 
world, and not the exercise of the right, which 
constitutes a way, a public highway, and the actual 
amount of travel upon it is not material. If it is 
open to all who desire to use it it is a public 
highway although it may accomodate only a lim-
ited portion of the public or even a single family, 
and although it accommodates some individuals 
more than others." (Emphasis supplied) (25 
Am. Jur . Highways — Sec. 2, Pgs. 339, 340) 
Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnes, 75 
Utah 384, 285 Pac. 646 
Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 Pac. 954 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 Pac. (2nd) 
420 
O.S.L. Ed. Co. vs. Murray Citv, 2 Utah (2nd) 
427, 277 Pac. (2nd) 798 
Leach v. Manhart, 102 Colo. 129, 77 Pac. (2nd) 
652 
"Use under private right is not sufficient. If 
the thoroughfare is laid out or used as a private 
way, its use, however long as a private way does 
not make it a public way. Use under private use 
is not sufficient * * * and the mere fact that 
the public make use of it without objection from 
the owner of the land will not make it a public 
way. Before it becomes public in character the 
owner of the land must consent to the change. 
(Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 161 Pac. 1127) 
3. AKGUMENT 
A. Private Prescriptive Rights on Public 
Domain 
The uncontroverted facts in this case absolutely 
deny plaintiff any private trailway easement over, upon 
12 
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or across lands of defendant above described. Any use 
of these lands by plaintiff and predecessors in title while 
the lands were part of the public domain cannot, of 
course, be considered in determining the existence of a 
private prescriptive right. (See authorities cited above.) 
Plaintiff commenced the present action on May 28, 1955, 
by filing his complaint in the office of the Clerk of the 
Court. He served and filed his answer to defendant's 
cross complaint and his supplemental complaint setting 
up his alleged private prescriptive right to a trailway 
easement over said lands on January 6, 1956. The Fed-
eral patent is dated Dec. 30, 1953, and was recorded Feb. 
15, 1954 (E. 118). If plaintiff is allowed the benefit of 
the January 6, 1956 date (date of filing his supple-
mental complaint) instead of May 28,1955 (date of filing 
his original complaint), the expired time after issuance of 
Federal patent during which plaintiff used defendant's 
said lands is not more than 1 year, 10 months and 21 days 
(time between date of recording patent—Feb. 15, 1954— 
and date of filing supplemental complaint—January 6, 
1956). If the period is computed from date of Federal 
patent (Dec. 30,1953) to date of filing supplemental com-
plaint (January 6,1956), the result is 2 years and 6 days. 
In either of said methods it is clearly obvious that plain-
tiff has failed in his proof of a prescriptive user of 20 
years or more. The facts and the law, as enunciated by 
the cited authorities, require judgment in defendant's 
favor on this facet and theory of the case. 
B. Highways Over Public Lands 
Plaintiff's cause of action as set forth in his Supple-
mental Complaint alleged facts upon which a claim for a 
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private prescriptive way could be based. I t is self evi-
dent from the allegations set forth above that the plead-
er's theory was that plaintiff had acquired by over twenty 
years continuous adverse user a private prescriptive 
trail way over defendant's lands appurtenant to plain-
tiff's land located in the area. This claim is defeated by 
the law and facts of the case as above demonstrated. An 
examination of plaintiff's evidence shows it was given in 
support of these allegations and of plaintiff's theory of 
this case. There is not a suggestion or implication in 
plaintiff's evidence that the general public was interested 
or had ever used the alleged trailway. He claimed and his 
evidence was directed to prove that he and his predeces-
sors in interest claimed a private right over defendant's 
lands. The defendant met this evidence by counter-posing 
evidence and the Court based his interrogatories on plain-
tiff's theory (Interrogatories 9 and 10). This aspect of 
the case was tried on the issue whether a private pres-
criptive easement existed over defendant's lands, and not 
on any other theory. 
The authorities above cited definitely differentiate 
between (a) a private easement acquired by prescription, 
and (b) a user by the public of sufficient substance as to 
indicate an acceptance by the public of the offer by the 
United States under K.S. 2477 (43 U.S.C.A., Sec. 932). 
I t is appropriate to repeat here the admonition of the 
Wyoming Supreme Court in Hatch Bros. Co. v. Black, 
supra: 
"I t must be borne in mind that it is not a ques-
tion of the establishment of a highway by pres-
cription which is here in question, but the accept-
ance of a grant ***" 
14 
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It will be a vain search of the trial record to at-
tempt to discover even a scintilla in evidence which will 
support a finding that prior to patent issuance to de-
fendant a public highway existed over defendant's land. 
Such evidence is simply not in the record. Evidence sup-
porting a claim for a private prescriptive easement will 
not prove the existence of a public highway. Each claim 
is separate from the other and in fact antagonistic. The 
Court of Civil Appeals of California pointed up the 
distinction in Ball v. Stephens supra, and the excerpt 
quoted from that decision is not only pertinent to the 
situation in this case, but decisively answers any argu-
ment which plaintiff might present to support a claim 
that defendant took title to his lands under the 1953 
patent burdened by public highway or road. Plaintiff 
in his supplemental complaint never claimed that there 
existed a "pre-patent" highway under E.S. 2477. His 
entire effort in his pleading and at the trial was to claim 
and prove a private trailway easement. 
Any argument in support of the "public highway" 
theory in this case fails to find support both in the evi-
dence and in the law. If this action be treated as a law 
action, then there is no finding by the jury as to the 
existence of a pre-patent public highway. The failure of 
the court to submit an interrogatory on this question is 
no fault of the court. It would have been error on its 
part to have done so inasmuch as plaintiff's pleadings 
and his evidence are based alone on the private pres-
criptive right theory. Neither did plaintiff request the 
Court to propound an interrogatory on the question of 
the existence of a pre-patent public highway. His perti-
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nent requested interrogatories do not contain the words 
"public highway." They pertain only to private prescrip-
tive rights. The "public highway" theory was not ad-
vanced at trial even by way of argument and certainly 
not by the pleadings or evidence. If this action be treated 
as one in equity the "public highway" theory fails be-
cause there is no evidence to support the finding of the 
pre-patent public user under R.S. 2477. The Court would 
commit gross error in making such a finding. Plaintiff, 
by means of his pleadings and evidence, lulled both the 
defendant and the Court into the belief that he was re-
lying only on the private prescriptive right theory. The 
pre-patent "public highway" theory and argument comes 
too late to be available to plaintiff. Beyond all per-
adventures defendant is entitled to judgment in his favor 
on this facet of the case. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF HAS ACQUIRED NO PRIVATE PRESCRIP-
TIVE TRAILWAY EASEMENT OVER DEFENDANT'S 
"HOMESTEAD PROPERTY/' BEING THE LAND CON-
VEYED TO DEFENDANT BY THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA BY PATENT DATED FEB. 6, 1939, AND RE-
CORDED ON AUGUST 7, 1939, IN BOOK 3 Y AT PAGES 377, 
378, AND NEITHER DID THERE EXIST A PUBLIC HIGH-
WAY OVER DEFENDANT'S SAID LAND PRIOR TO PAT-
ENT. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Defendant acquired the fee simple title to land de-
lineated as "Pink 2" on Exhibit P Ex. I by virtue of 
Federal patent dated February 6, 1939, and recorded on 
August 7, 1939 (R. 170). The land is particularly de-
scribed as: 
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NW% SE14 and SW*4 N E % of Sec. 15, Twp. 2 
South, Eange 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridi-
an. 
This land also was part of the public domain owned by 
the United States of America prior to the date of the 
patent. I t was acquired by defendant under the Federal 
Homestead Law, and is for convenience designated here-
in as ("Homestead" lands). Plaintiff has pleaded a 
private trailway easement over this "homestead" land 
(See Par . I, pg. 2 of his Supplemental Complaint) and 
attempted proof of facts in the endeavor to establish such 
private prescriptive trailway easement. This alleged 
private trailway easement represents the southeastern 
portion of the same trailway claimed b yplaintiff over the 
lands of defendant particularly described in Point I of 
this brief. The alleged trailway over the "homestead" 
lands is the initial portion of the alleged "Stansbury 
Is land" trailway (P Ex. I ) . Plaintiff's pleading and 
evidence were solely directed toward claiming and prov-
ing a private trailway easement over the "homestead" 
lands. There is not a scintilla of evidence in the record 
with respect to the existence of a pre-patent "public 
highway." Plaintiff requested no interrogatory on the 
question of the existence of a pre-patent public highway 
and the Court propounded none. Plaintiff's relevant 
pleading on this issue is quoted verbatim in Point I of 
this brief. There is no finding by the jury as to the 
existence of a pre-patent "public highway" over and 
across the "homestead" lands. 
2. CITATION OF AUTHOEITIES. 
See authorities cited in Point I, 2, supra of this 
brief. 
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3. ARGUMENT. 
Again plaintiff fails in establishing a private pre-
scriptive easement over and across defendant's lands last 
above described. The homestead patent in defendant's 
favor was dated February 6,1939, and was recorded Aug-
ust 7, 1939 (R. 170). Plaintiff filed his Supplemental 
Complaint alleging his right to a trailway easement over 
said land on January 6, 1956. The expired time is there-
fore 16 years, 4 months and 29 days. If the date of the 
patent is taken as the starting point (Feb. 6,1939) to date 
of filing Supplemental Complaint Jan. 6, 1956, the ex-
pired time is 16 years, and 11 months. Obviously neither 
of said computations yields a period of prescriptive user 
short of the required 20 years. The period of use of the 
defendant's lands by plaintiff and predecessors when 
title to same was in the United States cannot be and is 
not counted in determining the time of adverse user. 
(See authorities cited in Point I supra). In the first 
instance it is 3 years, 7 months and 1 day short. In the 
second instance it is 3 years and 1 month deficient. 
Tinder the law and the facts defendant is entitled to 
judgment of Court quieting his title as to said land 
against plaintiff's pretended claim of a private prescrip-
tive right over defendant's "homestead" lands. 
The pre-patent "public highway" theory is as equal-
ly inapplicable to defendant's "homestead" lands as it 
is to the lands of defendant described in Point I of this 
brief. The legal authorities and argument hereinbefore 
submitted against the adoption of said theory are restated 
and reaffirmed as to defendant's "homestead" lands. 
Manifestly defendant is entitled to judgment in this 
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action denying the existence of a pre-patent "pubic high-
way" over his "homestead" lands. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER ACQUIRED THE RIGHT TO 
USE THE WATER, WHICH DURING CERTAIN SEASONS 
OF THE YEAR ACCUMULATES ON DEFENDANT'S LAND 
SITUATE IN SECS. 9 AND 22, TWP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 5 
WEST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The pertinent findings by the jury relative to this 
phase of the case are found in response to the prepound-
ing of the following interrogatories : 
"11—Do you find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff and his predecessors in 
ownership used the lands of the defendant in Sec-
tions 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Eange 5 West and 
the water holes, if any, upon said lands to water 
his cattle for a period of 20 consecutive years prior 
to May 31,1955: Answer: Yes. 
"12—If your answer to No. 11 is yes, answer 
the following question: 
"For how many consecutive years prior to 
May 31, 1955, has the plaintiff and his prede-
cessors in ownership used said lands and water 
holes? Answer: 50 years." 
There are no jury findings as to the origin of the water 
nor its quantity, nor the nature and size of the deposit of 
water nor whether it was and is produced as a result of 
m a n o r as a natural accumulation, nor as to the frequency 
or infrequency of its accumulation on the said lands. The 
interrogations assumed the existence of water on said 
lands in "water holes." I t is therefore necessary to con-
sider the evidence introduced at the trial. There is a 
high degree of conflict in the evidence. The evidence of 
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the defendant denies the presence of water, and the exist-
ence of "water holes" (E. 18, 22). At the most, these are 
low places which are "bogs" or mud holes during most 
seasons of the year (R. 23). According to defendant, 
the "bog" or mud hole in Sec. 9 was "dynamited" in 1938 
or 1939 and since that time there has been no sign of 
water (R. 191). Defendant has never seen plaintiff's 
cattle drink at any "hole" on said section, but rather 
they went to adjacent flowing wells to drink (R. 19, 23). 
There were and are no live streams or springs on said 
sections. Examination of said lands was made in 1945 
by witnesses in connection with defendant's "exchange" 
transaction with the United States. These witnesses 
testified in substance that there were no "water holes" 
as the term is ordinarily used nor were there live streams 
or springs on the land. On one of the sections there was 
a low place or "bog" but it contained little if any water. 
Plaintiff testified "water holes" existed in said sec-
tions and cattle drank from same (R. 64, 65, 88). The 
water stands in the holes and does not flow out on the 
lands (R. 84). There are four small holes on Sec. 9 (R. 
83). They hold water the year long—water fit for cattle 
to drink (R. 85). Cattle have used them for years during 
all months of the year. The so called "water holes" are 
in truth but cow tracks which during certain seasons of 
the year fill with water (R. 86, 88). Water does not flow 
off in a channel (R. 87). Pierre Castagno testified in 
the summer of 1952 there was water in the "hole" on 
Sec. 9 sufficient to water 30 or 40 horses and that in the 
spring of the year there is sufficient water in the "holes" 
to water 20 or 30 head of cattle (R. 255). Tony Castagno 
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testified there are "water holes" on said sections, which 
contain water during all times of the year and in amount 
sufficient to water cattle. They are never completely 
dried up (E. 295). Eose Castagno stated there are three 
water holes on land "north of the old homestead" (E. 
304). None of them ever died up and they contained 
water at all times of drinkable quality (E. 304). Keith 
Wanless testified there are water holes on said sections 
and water is of such quantity and quality as to be drink-
able (E. 308, 310). Water was in the "holes" in 1956 suf-
ficient to water cattle (E. 310, 311). Twenty-five cows 
could water at those "holes" (E. 317). 
Included in the presentation of the Argument, here-
inafter contained, reference is made to other testimony 
in the case. 
2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTOEY EN-
ACTMENTS. 
(1) / / the water, which during certain seasons of 
the year accumulates on defendant's lands in Section 9 
and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake B. and 
M. is in the nature of either (a) waste or seepage water, 
or (b) surface water, or (c) percolating water, at no 
time has it been nor is it now subject to appropriation 
and neither could any rights thereto be acquired by pre-
scription. (56 Am. Jur.—Waters—Sec. 66, Pgs. 548, 549). 
A. Waste Water 
«### rpj^
 o w n e r 0f a w a t e r right, after diver-
sion from the stream is the owner and entitled to 
the water itself, the corpus of the water as long as 
he retains it in his ditches and reservoirs on his 
property and under his control # #* As long as the 
water is under the control of the appropriator in 
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his land or in his ditches or reservoirs or other 
things owned and controlled by him, it is still his 
water and he may use it in any lawful place or 
for any lawful use he chooses, or may lease and 
sell it. ***" (Smithfield West Bench Irrigation 
Co. v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 105 Utah 468, 
142 Pac. (2nd) 866, 871; also 113 Utah 356, 195 
Pac. (2nd) 249.) 
"However in the absence of such a statute it 
is generally held that such waste of water and 
seepage cannot be appropriated * * * The 
plaintiff apparently bases its claim to the exclu-
sive right to the use of this waste water whenever 
it is available upon the fact that it has been using 
such waste water for a long period of time without 
interruption. However, I do not believe that an 
exclusive right to the use of the waste water can 
be acquired in this manner." (Justice Wolfe in 
Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. v. Union 
Central Life Ins. Co., supra, and particularly at 
pg. 871 of 149 Pac. (2nd). 
See also: Lasson v. Seeley, 120 Utah 679, 238 
Pac. (2nd) 418. 
"The question for decision is whether the 
plaintiff has made a valid appropriation of waste 
water as against the defendants, or whether the 
defendants have a right, as against plaintiff, to 
intercept upon their own land, and before it 
passes therefrom, water which has been spread 
upon the same, but not entirely consumed, in the 
process of irrigation. It will be observed from 
the foregoing statement that it is only to such 
water as has actually escaped from defendants, 
and reached her own lands that plaintiff makes 
claim. *** It is manifest that, as against the de-
fendants, the plaintiff has not made a valid ap-
propriation of this alleged waste water. Just 
what constitutes waste water in every instance 
we do not decide, but it is unquestionably true, 
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so far as concerns the right to make a valid ap-
propriation of it, this water is not waste water 
so long as it remains upon the lands of the defend-
ants, and does not, in any event, become such until 
it has escaped and reached the lands of others. 
The plaintiff certainly has acquired no vested 
right to compel the defendants to apply the waters, 
the right to the use of which they own, in such a 
way as that some of it will not soak into their 
own ground, but escape and pass from the surface 
onto her lands. # # # So long as, and while, the water 
which is applied by defendants to the irrigation 
of their lands remains upon the same, it is, as 
against the plaintiff, their exclusive property, 
whatever may be the rights of plaintiff as against 
some other claimant to it as waste water." (BurJc-
art v. Meiberg, 37 Colo. 187, 86 Pac. 98, 6 LEA 
(NS) 1104.) 
"Defendant's case, both by pleading and evi-
dence, is that these waters did not constitute 
springs or natural water courses, but percolated 
through, and by artificial means had been collect-
ed into bodies or artificial springs on defendant 
Baker's own land, which by artificial surface 
channels flowed into plaintiff's canal, and was, 
with his consent, used by plaintiff only when he 
did not choose to use the same for his own law-
ful purposes, which he often did. # # # The trial 
court found, in accordance with the defendants' 
claim, that these waters originally existed as 
percolating waters in defendant Baker's land, and 
by artificial means were developed and collected 
by him into artificial basins in the semblance of 
springs, and as such, therefore, belonged to him, 
as an integral par t of his own land, which owner-
ship has never been divested. # # # The law, under 
the facts, makes these waters, arising, as they 
do, on defendant Baker 's lands, whether they be 
artificially collected percolating waters or the 
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waters of a natural flowing stream or spring, his 
property, as against the plaintiff in this case, un-
less the latter has acquired them in some way 
known to the law. *** And it is of no consequence 
here whether they are natural springs arising on 
the defendant's lands or have been intercepted 
as percolating waters and artificially collected. 
"The doctrine of appropriation, as under-
stood in the arid states, may or may not, under 
the facts of the case, apply to these waters. That 
we need not decide, for it is clear that, according 
to the findings, the plaintiff has not made a valid 
appropriation. *** I t is also equally clear that 
no right by prescription or adverse use has been 
established, for the findings were that whenever 
defendant Baker wished to use these waters for 
his own domestic purposes, for irrigating lands, 
or for filling fish ponds, or for sale as merchan-
dise, or otherwise, he did so under claim of owner-
ship." (Smith Canal and Ditch Co. v. Colorado Ice 
& Storage Co., 34 Colo. 485, 82 Pac. 940, 3 LEA 
(N.S.) 1148.) 
"I t is probably safer, for the benefit of all, 
and for the sake of stability of water rights, to de-
clare definitely that an appropriation of seepage 
water is void. Of course, if a party has once ob-
tained possession of such water, and another party 
not entitled thereto should attempt to deprive him 
thereof, the possessor would doubtless have a 
cause of action. Wiel, supra, Sec. 55. But that 
is not the situation here. The intervener wanted 
to get possession, and sues because Binning pre-
vented him from getting it." (Binning v. Miller, 
88. Wyo. 451; 102 Pac. (2nd) 54, at pg. 62). 
"Likewise, in Kinney on Irrigation, 2nd Ed., 
volume 2, page 1151, Section 661, is the following: 
'Authorities hold that while the water, 
so denominated as waste water, may be used 
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after it escapes, no permanent right can be 
acquired to have the discharge kept up, either 
by appropriation, or a right by prescription, 
estoppel, or acquiescence in its use while it is 
escaping, and that, too, even though expen-
sive ditches or works were constructed for 
the purpose of utilizing such waste water, 
unless some other element enters into the 
condition of affairs, other than the mere use 
of the water. In other words, the original ap-
propriators have the right, and in fact it is 
their duty to prevent, as far as possible, all 
waste of the water which they have appro-
priated, in order that the others who are en-
titled thereto may receive the benefit thereof.' 
Also, section 662, at page 1153: 
'After water has been appropriated and 
diverted from a natural stream into ditches, 
canals, or other artificial works, it becomes 
personal property and cannot be appropri-
ated from such works.' 
"There is no obligation upon an owner to con-
tinue to maintain conditions so as to supply water 
to appropriators of waste water at any time or 
in any quantity when acting in good faith." 
{Tongue Creek Orchard Co. v. Town of Orchard 
City, 131 Colo. 177, 280 Pac. (2nd) 426, 428.) 
"Neither the rule of reasonable use nor the 
rule of correlative rights has any application to 
percolating water which is the result of the land-
owner irrigating his land. The rules are limited 
in their application to such water as percolates 
through the soil from natural causes. If a land-
owner conveys water onto his premises by artifi-
cial irrigation and thereby causes water to perco-
late through his land and into adjoining land, the 
owner of the adjoining land does not acquire a 
vested right to have the water continue to so 
percolate through his land. A landowner may 
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irrigate or fail to irrigate his land, and, although 
by irrigation a benefit is conferred upon an ad-
joining landowner, such benefit may be withheld 
at pleasure. Percolating water resulting from the 
irrigation of one's own land may be recovered 
and used by the owner before it leaves his land 
without invading any right of an adjoining land-
owner." (Petersen v. Cache County Drainage Dis-
trict, 77 Utah 256, 294 Pac. 289, 291.) 
"I t is sufficient to here state, without approv-
ing or disapproving the doctrine of the reasonable 
use rule, that the facts as found by the court do 
not bring the case within that rule. The seepage 
or percolating water here involved is created by 
the artificial irrigation of appellant's land. True, 
as a result of this irrigation, the water sinks, 
seeps, and percolates into the soil of appellant's 
land and saturates it for a depth of several feet; 
it, nevertheless, is nothing more in fact and in 
law than surface or waste water. *** The law 
is well settled, in fact the authorities all agree, 
that one landowner receiving waste water which 
flows, seeps, or percolates from the land of an-
other cannot acquire a prescriptive right to such 
water, nor any right (except by grant) to have 
the owner of the land from which he obtains the 
water continue the flow. The general rule regard-
ing the right of the owner of land to surface water 
therein is stated by Mr. Farnham, in his work on 
Water Rights (page 2572), as follows: 'There is 
no right on the par t of a lower appropriator to 
have surface water flow to his land from upper 
property. The owner of the soil on which it falls 
has an absolute right to it, and may do with it 
what he pleases. And the fact that surface water 
has flowed from the land of one man onto that 
of another for more than 20 years will not prevent 
the former from draining his land so as to cut off 
the flow.' 
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"In 1 Wiel on Water Rights (3d Ed.) p. 50, 
the author says: 'While artificial flow claimants 
may thus have priorities between themselves, they 
can have no right of continuance against the own-
er of the natural supply (the appropriator on the 
natural stream ***), except by grant, condemna-
tion, or dedication (or by rule of compulsory ser-
vice where the water is distributed to public use). 
The chief instance of artificial flows in practice 
is where some stream owner has carried water 
to a distance and, after use, discharges it below 
his land or works. *** Seeing the water come 
down, other parties arrive, build ditches below, 
receive the water, and put it to use. Yet unless 
they have a contract with the stream owner, they 
must generally rely upon continued receipt from 
him of such water at their peril. In such case the 
creator of this artificial flow may cease to allow 
it to escape.' And on page 52 it is said: "In the 
absence of contract, the natural water-right owner 
may cease the abandonment of waste from a ditch, 
and so use the water that none of it thereafter 
runs waste, or so that it runs off in a new place 
where people below no longer can get it. Long 
receipt by them of the water of itself gives no 
permanent right to have the discharge continued, 
whether by appropriation, prescription, or es-
toppel, even though the lower claimants built ex-
pensive ditches or flumes to catch the waste.' 
Numerous decisions are cited by the author in a 
note to the text which illustrate and support this 
doctrine. And again on page 54 it is said: 'Waste 
water soaking from the land of another after irri-
gation need not be continued, and may be inter-
cepted and taken by such original irrigator, and 
conducted elsewhere, though parties theretofore 
using the waste are deprived thereof.' (Gam v. 
Rollins, 41 Utah 260, 125 Pac. 867, 871, 872.) 
"It is a rule long recognized that a landowner 
cannot acquire a prescriptive right to the con-
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tinued flow of waste or seepage water from the 
land of another, that is, seepage water or waste 
water running from one's land to that of another 
need not be continued and it may be intercepted 
and taken by such owner at any time and used on 
the land to which it is appurtenant. 
'No valid appropriation can be made or 
prescriptive right acquired by gathering sur-
plus water as it flows over the surface from 
adjoining property upon which it has been 
spread for irrigation purposes, or by merely 
accepting and using water when it is allowed 
to flow into one's ditch by the original owner, 
who makes exclusive use of it whenever he 
chooses to do so.' 30 Am. Jur . 611, Sec. 19. 
"The original appropriator may at any time 
recapture waste water remaining on his land and 
apply it to a beneficial use. Barker v. Sonner, 135 
Or. 75, 294 P. 1053; Sebern v. Moore, 44 Idaho 410, 
258 P . 176; Reynolds Irrigation Co. v. Sproat, 
70 Idaho 217, 214 P. 2d 880. 
"Hence, as against the original appropriator 
and owner, an adjoining land owner cannot ac-
quire a prescriptive right to waste or seepage 
water." (Thompson v. Bingham, 78 Idaho 305, 302 
Pac. (2nd) 948, 949. 
"We think the evidence both for appellants 
and respondent tends to show that the waters in 
dispute are seepage and percolating waters. These 
waters rose in such quantities on respondent's 
land that it became submerged and was rendered 
unfit for the raising of hay and other farm prod-
ucts. The respondent undoubtedly had a right to 
drain his land of the water and put it in a condi-
tion for raising crops. Whether he did this by 
sinking wells or by digging drain ditches was 
of no concern to appellants. The water thus de-
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veloped or collected being waste water which seeps 
and percolates into respondent's land from adjoin-
ing lands, he had the legal right to make what-
ever beneficial use of it he deemed proper, and he 
did not invade any right of appellant's by so doing. 
We think the right to the use of the water in this 
case comes squarely within the rule announced in 
the case of Garns v. Eollins, 125 Pac. 867, recently 
decided by this court." {Roberts v. Gribble, 43 
Utah 411, 134 Pac. 1014, 1016.) 
B. Surface Water 
"The term 'surface water ' is used in the law 
of waters in reference to a distinct form or class 
of water which is generally defined as that which 
is derived from falling rain or melting snow, or 
which rises to the surface in springs, and is dif-
fused over the surface of the ground while it re-
mains in such diffused state or condition. I t is 
thus distinguished from water flowing in a natural 
water course or collected into and forming a defi-
nite and identifiable body, such as a lake or pond. 
In some instances the courts have classed as sur-
face waters such as lie or spread over the surface, 
or percolate the soil, as in swamps and do not flow 
in any particular direction." (56 Am. Jur . — 
Waters—Sec. 65, pgs 547, 548.) 
"(Surface) waters, in a legal sense are those 
which fall on the land, by precipitation from the 
skies, or arise in springs and spread over the sur-
face of the ground without being collected into a 
definite body. McDaniel v. Cummings, 83 Cal. 
515; 8 L.E.A. 575, 23 Pac. 795; 3 Farnham Waters, 
Sec. 278." (San Gabriel Valley Country Club v. 
Los Angeles County, 182 Cal. 392, 188 Pac. 554, 
9 A.L.E. 1200.) 
"Surface waters are those which are produced 
by rain fall, melting snow, or springs, and which 
in cases of the two first mentioned sources are 
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precipitated, and in the case of the last mentioned 
source rise upon the land *** Such waters are not 
divested of their character as surface waters by 
reason of their flowing from the land on which 
they first make their appearance on to lower land 
in obedience to the law of gravity." (Le Brun v. 
Richards, 210 Cal. 308, 291 Pac. 825, 72 A.L.R. 
336.) 
"The term 'surface water' includes such as is 
carried off by surface drainage—this is drainage 
independently of a water course." (Snyder v. Piatt 
Valley, etc. Irrig. Co., 144 Neb. 308, 12 N.W. (2d) 
160, 160 A.L.R. 1164.) 
"*** the weight of authority is to the effect 
that the right to flow of surface water from an ad-
joining tract cannot be acquired by prescription." 
(56 Am. Jur . Waters, Sec. 66, pg. 549.) 
"From the facts here it is clear that we are 
not concerned with the rules which pertain to 
surface waters in the commonly accepted mean-
ing
 #of that term in adjudications of this type. 
That term as so used means water diffused over 
the surface of the ground and derived generally 
from falling rains or melting snow, and it con-
tinues to be such until it reaches well defined 
channels wherein it customarily flows at which 
time it becomes part of a stream. Once part of a 
stream, it does not again become surface wrater 
simply because it overflows the banks. Water 
which continues to flow in the same direction even 
though outside the banks, and which returns to the 
channel upon the subsidence of the flood is par t 
of a running stream and it loses its character as 
such only when it spreads out over the open coun-
try, settles in lakes or pools, or finds some other 
outlet." (McKell v. Spanish Fork, 6 Utah (2nd) 
92, 305 Pac. (2nd) 1097.) 
C. Percolating Waters 
"The waters issuing from the artificial tunnel 
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into the lake are found to be underground, perco-
lating waters from the mining claim of the defend-
ant, and not waters naturally flowing in a stream 
with a well-defined channel, banks, and course. 
Under such a state of facts, the law seems to be 
well settled that water percolating through the 
soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished from the 
soil itself. The owner of the soil is entitled to 
the waters percolating through it, and such water 
is not subject to appropriation. The ordinary 
rules of law applying to the appropriation of 
surface streams do not apply to percolating water 
and subterranean streams, with undefined and 
unknown courses and banks. When water perco-
lates through and under the surface of the earth 
upon land belonging to one person, and comes 
to the surface just before it empties itself upon 
the land of another, the owner of such land has 
no right to demand that such percolation shall 
continue. ***. 
"It is clear that, prior to the time when the 
tunnel was dug upon the mining claim of the de-
fendant, the water w a^s percolating water, flowing, 
seeping, or circulating in minute particles beneath 
the surface thereof, without banks or defined chan-
nels, and that its course was invisible and un-
known. By the construction of this tunnel, this 
percolating Avater has become an artificial stream, 
and has never been diverted from the defendant's 
land, nor its waters taken away from the defend-
ant or its grantors. Under such circumstances, 
when percolating waters have been gathered into 
tunnels or ditches, and allowed to flow from the 
proprietor's land to the inferior proprietor, and 
have been used by him a greater period of time 
than that allowed by the statute of limitations, it 
has been held that no title by prescription has 
been gained." {Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver Kino 
Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, 54 Pac. 244, 245, 247.) 
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"When the United States issued it patent to 
the respondent, neither the bog nor marsh, nor 
the water in question, was visible upon the land 
conveyed. Nor was there any known and defined 
subterranean stream thereon. At that time the 
water, if it existed at all, was percolating through 
the soil, or flowing in a subterranean stream, 
having no defined or known channels, courses, or 
banks. Water so percolating and flowing forms a 
par t of the realty, and belongs to the owner of 
the soil. A conveyance or grant by the United 
States of any part of the public domain to a per-
son, natural or artificial, carries with it the right 
of filtrating or percolating water, and to streams 
flowing through the soil beneath the surface, but 
in undefined and unknown channels, just the same 
as it carries with it the right to rocks and minerals 
in the ground which have not been reserved in the 
instrument of conveyance or by statute. Water, 
intermingling with the ground or flowing through 
it by filtration or percolation or by chemical at-
traction, is but a component part of the earth, and 
has no characteristics of ownership distinct from 
the land itself. In the eye of the law, water so com-
mingled and flowing, or motionless, underneath 
the surface, is not the subject of ownership apart 
and distinct from the soil. If, however, subsur-
face streams of water flow in clearly-defined 
channels, it is otherwise, for then the rules of 
law applicable to surface streams and waters 
apply." (Willow Creek Irrigation Co. v. Michael-
son, 21 Utah 248, 60 Pac. 943.) 
(2) At all times since May 11,1903, the only method 
by which plaintiff could have acquired the right to use 
the waters which accumulates on defendant's lands in 
Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 South, Range 5 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, was by formal appropriation 
of same as prescribed by the statutes of the State of Utah. 
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The acquisition of rights to use water in Utah by pres-
cription has been prohibited since said date. 
A. Constitutional and Statutory Enactments 
"All existing rights to the use of any waters 
in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, 
are hereby recognized and confirmed." (Constitu-
tion of State of Utah, ART. XVII, Sec. 1.) 
"All waters in this state, whether above or 
under the ground are hereby declared to be the 
property of the public, subject to all existing 
rights to the use thereof." (Laws of Utah 1919, 
Chap. 67, Sec. 1; R.S. 1933, Sec. 100-1-1; Laws of 
Utah 1935, Chap. 105, Sec. 1; Utah Code Ann. 
1943, Sec. 100-1-1; Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 73-
1-1.) 
The Fifth Regular Session of the Legislature of the 
State of Utah, convened in February and March, 1903, 
adopted a Water Code which repealed all prior laws on 
the subject of Water Rights and Irrigation. (Laws of 
Utah, 1903, Chap. 100, pg. 88). Section 34 of this enact-
ment reads as follows: 
"Rights to the use of any of the unappropri-
ated water in the State may be acquired by ap-
propriation, in the manner hereinafter provided, 
and not otherwise. The appropriation must be 
for some useful or beneficial purpose, and, as 
between appropriators, the one first in time should 
be first in right" (Italics supplied.) 
This new Water Code was approved by the Governor 
on March 12, 1903, and became effective sixty days after 
March 12, 1903 (date of sine die adjournment of the 
Legislature), or on May 11, 1903. 
The Sixth Regular Session of the Legislature of the 
State of Utah convened in February and March, 1905, 
repealed Chapter 100 of the Laws of Utah 1903 (Laws of 
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Utah 1905, Chap. 108, pg 145), and enacted another Water 
Code. However, the 1905 Code continued, Sec. 34 of the 
1903 Code, in exact form as above set forth. (It con-
tinued to bear the number of Section 34.) The 1905 Code 
specifically provided, according to Constitutional man-
date, that it should become effective on approval. The 
Governor approved the Code March 9,1905, and said date 
was therefore the effective date of the 1905 Code. 
When Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 were prepared, 
the Water Code of 1905 became Chapter 2 of Title 40 of 
said Compiled Laws and Sec. 34 of the Water Code of 
1903 and 1905 were perpetuated in exact form and phrase-
ology as first above quoted as Sec. 1288X5 Compiled Laws 
of Utah 1907. 
The Ninth Regular Session of the Legislature of the 
State of Utah, convened January-February and March, 
1911, amended Sec. 1288X5 (Compiled Laws of Utah 
1907, Chap. 103, Laws of Utah 1911, pg. 143) to read as 
follows: 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated 
water in the State may be acquired by appropria-
tion in the manner hereinafter provided, and not 
otherwise. The appropriation must be for some 
useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between 
appropriators, the one first in time shall be first 
in right; (provided that, when a use designated in 
an application to appropriate any of the unappro-
priated waters of the State would materially inter-
fere with a more beneficial use of such water, then 
the appropriation shall be dealt with as provided 
in Section 1288X18). (Italics supplied.) 
The Governor approved this Act on March 20, 1911. 
The Legislative session adjourned March 9, 1911. The 
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Act, therefore became effective May 10, 1911. 
When Compiled Laws of 1917 were prepared, Sec. 
1288X5, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1907, as amended by 
Chapter 103, Laws of Utah, 1911, last above quoted, be-
came Sec. 3450, Comp. Laws of Utah 1917, and was a 
part of Title 55, Chap. 3. 
The Thirteenth Regular Session of the Legislature 
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1919, 
by Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919 (pg. 177) repealed 
the Water Code as it appeared in Title 55, Chapters 1, 
2and 3, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, and enacted an 
entirely new Water Code. However, Sec. 41 of this enact-
ment repeated verbatim Sec. 3450, Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1917. Chapter 67, Laws of Utah 1919, was approved 
March 13, 1919, and since it carried an emergency clause 
it became effective on said date. 
Title 100, Chap. 3, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933, 
set forth verbatim Sec. 41, Laws of Utah 1919 (which 
in its amended form was Sec. 3450, Comp. Laws of Utah 
1917). In the R.S. of Utah 1933 the pertinent section 
was designated Sec. 100-3-1 of the R.S. 
The twenty-first Regular Session of the Legislature 
of Utah, convened January, February and March 1935, 
amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, to read as fol-
lows: 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated pub-
lic waters in this state may be acquired only as 
provided in this title. No appropriation of water 
may be made and no rights to the use thereof 
initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate 
shall be recognized except application for such 
appropriation first be made to the State Engineer 
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in the manner hereinafter provided, and not other-
wise. The appropriation must be for some useful 
and beneficial purpose and as between appro-
priators, the one first in time shall be first in 
right; provided that when a use designated by an 
application to appropriate any of the unappro-
priated waters of the State would materially 
interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, 
the application shall be dealt with as provided in 
Section 100-3-8." (Italics supplied.) (Laws of 
Utah, 1935, Chap. 105, pg. 195-196.) 
The Twenty-third Regular Session of the Legisla-
ture of Utah, convened January, February and March 
1939, amended Sec. 100-3-1, R.S. of Utah 1933, as amend-
ed by Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 105, quoted 
in full above, by repeating same in exact language as 
above set forth and then adding: 
"No right to the use of water either appro-
priated or unappropriated can be acquired by ad-
verse use or adverse possession." 
This amended statute of 1939 carried an emergency 
clause and thereby became effective on approval, which 
was March 20, 1939. 
Utah Code Ann. 1943, repeats the 1939 reenactment 
and amendment in exact form as above given, as Sec. 
100-3-1. Likewise Utah Code Ann. 1953 repeats the 1939 
enactment and amendment as Sec. 73-3-1, and brings the 
provision to date. 
B. Judicial Decisions 
"The question is therefore clearly presented 
whether the actual diversion of water prior to 
making an application to the state engineer gives 
to the party making the diversion a right superior 
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to another who first files his -application in the 
state engineer's office. 
"Chapter 67. Laws of Utah 1919, relates to 
water and water rights. The act is designated as 
'An act defining general provisions concerning 
water and water rights, the appropriation, admin-
istration,' etc., and amends some prior laws. Sec-
tion 41 of that chapter, so far as material here, 
provides: 
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated 
public water in the state may be acquired 
by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter 
provided, and not otherwise." 
"The section further provides that tfte ap-
propriation must be for a beneficial purpose, ana 
that as between two appropriators the one first in 
time shall be first in right. *** The first Utah 
legislative act, so far as I have been able to as-
certain, respecting the method or mode of appro-
priating water, was passed by the Legislature of 
1897 (Laws 1897, c. 52). *** By the act of 1897 any 
person desiring thereafter to appropriate water 
was required to post notices in writing in two 
conspicuous places, one at the post office nearest 
the point of intended diversion, and the other at 
the point of intended diversion. *** Apparently 
no other or further legislation was enacted re-
specting the appropriation of w^ater until 1903. 
(Laws 1903 c. 100). The Legislature in that year 
incorporated in the act relating to water rights 
and irrigation section 41 as the same appears in 
chapter 67. Laws Utah 1919. Numerous amend-
ments were made to the irrigation laws of this 
state by the Legislatures meeting since 1903, but 
in none of such legislation has the method or man-
ner of appropriating water as prescribed by the 
Legislature of 1903 been changed or modified. *#* 
If our statute did not contain the words 'and not 
otherwise,' then the decisions of the appellate 
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courts of Idaho and Wyoming ought to and would 
have much weight in a determination of the ques-
tion now under consideration. I t is a matter of 
common knowledge in this state that many contro-
versies arose between claimants and much litiga-
tion resulted prior to our legislative act of 1903 
respecting the dates of the appropriation by dif-
ferent claimants of the waters of the state. Very 
much of that litigation had to do exclusively with 
the dates of the appropriations. The rule or prin-
ciple of law that he who was first in time was 
first in right had become permanently established 
in the jurisprudence of the state. The fact as to 
who was a prior appropriator was in much, if not 
all, of the litigation a controverted question, and 
one which in many cases was most difficult to 
determine by reason of there being no public rec-
ord of just when such appropriations were made. 
I t is therefore not only reasonable and fair to con-
clude, but affords a strong argument to support 
the claim, that the language found in the act of 
1903 was intended to mean and does mean that the 
only method to be recognized thereafter was the 
method therein prescribed. #** We are of the 
opinion, and so hold, that the Legislature of Utah, 
by the act of 1903, intended to limit the method of 
acquiring any rights to the unappropriated public 
waters of the state to the method or means pre-
scribed in that act. The rights attempted to be 
acquired by respondent Hooppiania by actually 
diverting the water and applying the same to a 
beneficial use must therefore be held to be subject 
to the right of appellant who will acquire the first 
right by completing its appropriation initiated by 
its application filed in the state engineer's office 
on April 25, 1918." (Deseret Live Stock Co. v. 
Hooppiana, 66 Utah 25, 239 Pac. 479, 482, 483.) 
" I concur in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice 
Gideon that Chopter 67, Sess. Laws of Utah 1919, 
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provides an exclusive method for the appropria-
tion of public water in the state of Utah. The very 
language and purpose of the act, when construed 
in connection with the acts which it superseded 
and repealed, demonstrates conclusively that the 
purpose was to provide an exclusive method of 
appropriating water and securing a record title 
thereto. * * * The method presented for appropri-
ating water commences with chapter 100, Sess. 
Laws 1903, § 34, which section furnishes the key 
for interpreting all that follows down to and 
including section 46. Section 34 reads as follows: 
'Rights to the use of any of the unappro-
priated water in the state may be acquired 
by appropriation, in the manner hereinafter 
provided, and not otherwise. The appropria-
tion must be for some useful or beneficial 
purpose, and, as between appropriators, the 
one first in time shall be first in right.' 
* * * The history of the legislation upon this 
subject, as above set forth, discloses the fact that 
the statute involving the question now before 
the court has been under review at eight differ-
ent sessions of the Utah Legislature. The law, 
as originally enacted in 1903, has been amended 
and changed in divers respects, immaterial as 
far as the question here is concerned, but the 
manifestly exclusive features of the method of 
procedure to procure title have never been 
changed. * # * If plain, emphatic, unequivocal 
language is not sufficient to express the intention 
of the Legislature, in what manner and by what 
means can the Legislature express its intention? 
If there were a single line, word, or thought any-
where in the act inconsistent or in conflict with 
the express declaration of the Legislature at the 
very starting point of the method of procedure 
mapped out by the Legislature, I would concur 
in the suggestion that we should resort to rules 
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of construction in order to determine the inten-
tion of the statute; but the truth is the statute 
is so plain from he beginning to the end of the 
whole course of procedure that there is no occa-
sion for resorting to rules of construction. * * * 
Before concluding this opinion I feel impelled 
to say that this statute has been in force for a 
period of 22 years. Hundreds of thousands of 
dollars of the public money have been expended 
in maintaining suitable offices and paraphernalia 
for carrying out the purposes of the act, to say 
nothing about the amounts paid in salaries to 
the state engineer and his deputies, assistants, 
and clerks. I t cannot be denied that a system 
whereby a complete record is required of rights 
and titles to the use of water is infinitely super-
ior to a system, if it can be called a system, 
in which the evidence of title rests entirely in 
parol and depends solely upon the memory of 
man. I t may be contended that this goes to the 
policy of the act which belongs exclusively to the 
Legislature, and is therefore outside the domain 
of judicial interpretation. We contend, however, 
that if the policy of the act is manifestly wise 
and superior to previous systems from the stand 
point of policy, it is one of the most cogent 
reasons why we should hold that the Legislature 
must have intended exactly what it said and has 
repeated and reiterated time after time for al-
most a quarter of a century." (Concurring opinion 
of Mr. Justice Thurman in Deseret Livestock Co. 
vs. Hooppiania, supra) 
"But respondents argue that all these cases, 
except the one last cited, were either tried or 
were based upon rights claimed to have been 
acquired prior to the enactment of the law of 
appropriation of water through the office of the 
state engineer, and (1) since the enactment of 
that statute, water rights can only be acquired 
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by appropriation through the office of the state 
engineer and can only be lost by abandonment, 
and when abandoned it reverts to the state; and 
(2) if water can be acquired by adverse user and 
possession since the enactment of the appropria-
tion laws, it cannot be so done after adjudication 
of the rights, and in defiance of the terms of the 
adjudication decree. The answer to the first prop-
osition is found within the terms of the statute, 
relative to appropriation. Sections 100-3-1 and 
100-3-2, R.S. 1933, read: 
'Rights to the use of the unappropriated 
public waters in this state may be acquired 
by appropriation in the manner hereinafter 
provided, and not otherwise.' Section 100-3-1. 
'Any person who is a citizen * * * in 
order hereafter to acquire the right to the 
use of any unappropriated public water in 
this state shall before commencing the con-
struction * * * make an application in writ-
ing to the state engineer.' Section 100-3-2. 
It is clear from the language that the sections 
above quoted apply only to acquiring rights in 
the unappropriated public water, and have no 
reference to water rights which have passed to 
private ownership until they have been abandoned 
and thereby reverted to the public. How may 
water rights under the statute be lost? Section 
3468, Comp. Laws 1917, in force during the times 
involved in this action, reads: 
'When the appropriator or his successor 
in interest abandons or ceases to use water 
for a period of seven years, the right ceases, 
and thereupon such water reverts to the 
public, and may again be appropriated, as pro-
vided in this title; but questions of abandonment 
shall be questions of fact, and shall be de-
termined as are other questions of fact.' 
Construing this section, this court in Deseret 
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Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah, 25, 239 
P. 479, 481, said: 
'By express language of the foregoing 
statute there are two methods or means by 
which one entitled to the use of waters in 
the state may lose such right: (1) by aban-
donment; and (2) by ceasing to use the same 
for a period of seven years . ' " 
(Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2nd) 
894, 899; also 94 Utah 35, 75 Pac. (2nd) 164) 
"Under our laws, rights in and to the use 
of public waters, or of a natural stream or source, 
may be acquired only by appropriation and by 
an actual diversion of waters from the natural 
channel or stream and a beneficial use made of 
them and as by our statutes provided. Neither 
the defendants nor their predecessors made any 
diversion of the waters of the creek for watering 
live stock or for any other purpose. They, without 
any diversion, merely permitted animals to drink 
directly from the creek. That gave them no right 
to or possession of the use of the waters, for as 
said by the author, 2 Kinney on Irrigation and 
Water Eights, 1242 that as 'no possession or 
exclusive property (of water) can be acquired 
while it is still flowing and remaining in its 
natural channel or stream, it follows, therefore, 
that in order to obtain possession of the water 
attempted to be appropriated, it is an indispens-
able requisite that there must be an actual diver-
sion of the water from its natural channel into 
the appropriator's ditch, canal, reservoir, or other 
structure.' Cases are there cited in support of 
the text." (Bountiful City v. De Luca, 77 Utah 
107, 118; 292 Pac. 194, 199; 72 A.L.R. 657) 
"If this be new or added water, no right 
thereto can attach or be asserted until after an 
application has been filed in the office of the 
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state engineer. Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hoop-
piania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479; Bountiful City v. 
Be Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 194, 72 A.L.R. 657. 
If it be considered as merely a change in place 
of diversion, it also must start with an application 
in the office of the state engineer, and notice 
must be given so interested parties could be heard 
and their rights protected. Appellants pleaded in 
their answer, and testified, that the proposed 
works w^ould save from evaporation and seepage 
a considerable quantity of water and the Company 
would permit the Town to divert into its pipe 
line a part thereof in consideration of the Town 
doing the work and furnishing the money to 
effect the savings. No application was made to 
the state engineer either to appropriate this water 
or to change the point of diversion of their water. 
I t is admitted that defendants' works would in-
close the entire stream now flowing in its natural 
channel, thus excluding everyone (the public) 
from enjoyment of all rights therein. When a 
person seeks to do this, he has the burden of 
showing his right so to do, and this burden appel-
lants did not carry." (Adams v. Town of Portage, 
95 Utah 1, 72 Pac. ((2nd) 648, 654 
"What we did say was that the records (the 
pleadings of appellant and the evidence) show the 
waters in dispute, from which appellant sought to 
exclude respondents and the public generally, 
were waters which appellants had not appropri-
ated, either by user before enactment of the stat-
utory method, chapter 100, Laws Utah, 1903, now 
Eev. St. 1933, 100-3-1 et seq., or by application 
in the office of the engineer since such method 
was prescribed. The trial court so found, and we 
upheld that finding. Thus, holding that appellants 
had never had any rights to the waters used by 
respondents, the question of adverse user since 
1903 is in nowise determinative of the cause." 
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(Adams v. Town of Portage, 95 Utah 20, 81 Pac. 
(2nd) 368 on rehearing) 
"In the light of this evidence we proceed to 
consider the defenses urged. First, as to the de-
fense of valid appropriation. We conclude that 
if these defendants had made a valid appropri 
ation prior to the Kimball Decree, all rights se-
cured thereunder would have been lost by the 
entry of that Decree which awarded them no 
water. Since the entry of the Kimball Decree in 
1922, in fact since 1903, the method for appropri-
ation of unappropriated water has been prescribed 
by statute and we have consistently held that 
this statutory procedure for appropriating water 
is exclusive. Hammond v. Johnson, supra; Adams 
v. Portage Irr. Reservoir, § Power Co., supra; 
Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, supra; 
Bountiful City v. Be Luca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 
194; 72 A.L.R. 657. Although this statutory pro-
cedure has been amended at various times (see 
Chap. 105, Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. I l l , Laws 
of Utah 1939) at all times since 1903 the statutory 
procedure has required a filing of an application 
with the State Engineer. The evidence fails to 
show that this procedure was followed by these 
defendants and their defense of valid appropria-
tion must fail." (Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. 
Lindsay Land # L. Co., 104 Utah 448, 137 Pac. 
(2nd) 634, 644) 
3. ARGUMENT 
(A) The waters on defendants' land in Sec. 9 
and 22 were not and are not subject to ap-
propriation or prescriptive user. 
The findings of the jury do not disclose the nature, 
source, origin, kind or quantity of water which plaintiff 
and his witnesses assert exist and has existed upon 
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defendant's lands in Sections 9 and 22, Twp. 2 S., Range 
5 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. The responses 
by the jury to the interrogatories propounded to it 
by the Court simply indicate the time element involved 
in plaintiff's alleged use of the waters based on an 
assumption that water in some amount existed on Sees. 
9 and 22, during the duration of use. I t is therefore 
necessary to examine and consider the relevant evidence 
in order to determine the necessary facts with respect 
to said water. 
Insofar as the defendant's evidence is concerned, 
it denies the existence of water and "water holes" on 
said lands (R. 136) and presents proof that at the most 
there existed during certain seasons of certain years only 
"bogs" or "mud holes" located in certain small restricted 
areas (R. 177, 178, 179, 186). They were occasioned by 
precipitation primarily and flow of melting snows and 
probably by a small amount of percolating water in de-
fendant's land which came to the surface and then gravi-
tted to low places on said land (R. 137). The source of 
this small amount of moisture is not directly disclosed 
by the evidence. Defendant's evidence was corroborated 
by that of the witnesses, Aldous, Palmer and Price, who 
testified that there was a "bog" on Sec. 9, but no water 
holes (R. 175, 177, 178, 179, 181, 241, 242). 
Plaintiff's evidence in the main contradicts that of 
of the defendant. Plaintiff and his witnesses testified as 
to water and "water holes" but never mentioned the 
source of the water. It is interesting to note that plain-
tiff's evidence during the course of trial became progres-
sively more "moist" and "wetter." Commencing with 
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plaintiffs own testimony in his case in chief—"The whole 
place is not covered with water. There are holes watered. 
Did yon ever see a cow make a track * * *" (R. 86). 
"There is not enough water to flow away" (R. 87). (Plain-
tiff testified there existed a water hole in SE y^ Sec. 9 
Sec. 22) (R. 63, 64, 83, 84). He marked these alleged 
holes on the map P Ex. 1 (R. 64). When plaintiff testified 
on rebuttal, the one water hole in Sec. 9 became (R. 83) 
four holes (R. 279) and they contained water during all 
months of the year and they always contained water 
that cattle could and do use (R. 279, 280). Pierre Cas-
tagno produced sufficient water in these "holes" to 
water 30 or 40 horses (R. 255). Tony Castagno asserted 
that the "holes" never dried up and contained water 
during all years at all times in sufficient amount to 
water cattle (R. 295). Rose Castagno asserted that the 
"holes" never dried up and there was water in them at 
all times of drinkable quality (R. 304). Keith Wanless 
called the water accumulations "spring holes" (R. 309). 
He said they contained "spring water" not "run off" 
water (R. 316) but did not identify the source of the 
water. Cattle drank at the so-called "holes" (R. 310). 
The conflict in the evidence as to whether water 
existed on the defendant's lands was not resolved by 
the jury. I t remains a question of fact for the fact 
finder. If no water is found to exist, then of course the 
defendant is entitled to judgment on this issue. How-
ever, defendant believes it expedient to present his argu-
ment on the assumption (and this is an assumption in 
favor of plaintiff and is made for purposes of argu-
ment only) that some kind of water and of some (but 
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unknown amount has existed on Sees. 9 and 22 aforesaid. 
Plaintiff's evidence identifies this water as either 
(a) waste or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or 
(c) percolating water. I t is certainly not water flowing 
in an established course. I t is not water in a pond. I t is 
not water flowing directly from a spring. I t is not 
"live" water. I t is not "natural" water. I t possesses 
certain elements of "surface" water and certain elements 
of percolating water. Interpreting the evidence in a light 
most favorable to plaintiff, the water appears to be 
"dead" water representing moisture which has accum-
ulated in low places on defendant's land during certain 
periods of the year depending upon amount of natural 
precipitation and seepage from other areas. 
The water thus identified and described by plaintiff 
and his witnesses is exactly the type and kind of water 
that is not and never has been subject either to formal 
appropriation under the water laws nor subject to be 
acquired by prescriptive user. The authorities cited above 
from Utah and neighboring states without contradiction 
declare this principle. Quoted authorities on irrigation 
and water law, after defining waste or seepage water, 
surface and percolating water, unanimously declare that 
the use thereof cannot be acquired by prescriptive user. 
I t is not the type or kind of water described in Sullivan 
vs. Northern Spy Mining Co., 11 Utah 438, 40 Pac. 709, 
55 A.L.E. 1448, but rather it classifies under the heading 
of percolating water "rising in the form of a bog or 
marsh" as was involved in Willow Creek Irrigation Co. 
v. Michaelssen, supra, or underground percolating water 
of Cresent Mining Co. vs. Silver King Mining Co., supra. 
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Allowing the evidence in this case its maximum 
thrust in favor of plaintiff, it falls far short of estab-
lishing and identifying the water on defendant's lands 
as being water subject to appropriation or the use of 
which may be obtained by prescription. Pa r t of this 
water was and is undoubtedly a component part of the 
earth owned by defendant, percolating through defend-
ant's soil and finally coming to the surface to form 
bogs or marshes. I t can be surmised that other parts 
of it represent melting snow and rain which have 
fallen on the surface of defendant's land and then 
drained to low places on his land. Plaintiff's evidence 
does not even imply or suggest that any part of it 
came from artesian wells driven by plaintiff in Sees. 
9 and 22. His evidence carefully eliminates this source 
because they were driven only within the last two or 
three years. 
In resolving the conflict in evidence the court made 
the following findings: 
"19. A small but uncertain amount of water 
has accumulated during certain seasons of years 
upon lands of defendant situated in Sections 9 
and 22, Township 2, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, for 20 years prior to May 31, 1955. 
I t has not been and is not water of the type, kind 
or quality that title thereto or use thereof can be 
acquired by prescription, adverse possession or 
adverse user, being either waste water, surface 
water or percolating water. Such water has ac-
cumulated in low places consisting of swales and 
marshy areas of these sections. I t has remained 
\ in low areas and has not flowed out upon adjoin-
ing land. Much of the water is surface water 
which was produced by rainfall and melting snows. 
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Its quantity has varied from year to year. During 
dry seasons of the years and during years of small 
or limited precipitation the small amount of w^ater 
in these low areas disappeared and the low areas 
became mere bogs or mud holes. During certain 
periods of the years when water accumulated in 
these low places wandering cattle OAvned by plain-
tiff and others drank at these lo wplaces. Neither 
plaintiff nor his predecessors in title and interest 
have ever attempted any appropriation of said 
water under the statutes of the State of Utah. 
This accumulation of water does not originate or 
flow from any natural water course nor has it 
ever originated or flowed from any natural water 
course. A small proportion of this water is prob-
ably water which percolates and has percolated 
through the soil of defendant's lands and finally 
came to the surface in the low areas described. 
Said amount of said water forms and has always 
formed a part of the realty which has belonged 
and now belongs to defendant. There is no known 
and defined subterranean stream on defendant's 
land or in the vicinity thereof wherein this water 
might originate." 
The trial court found in favor of the defendant 
on this aspect of the case. He is therefore entitled upon 
appellate review to have the evidence and every reason-
able inference fairly to be drawn therefrom to be viewed 
in the light most favorable to him. (Buehner Block Co. 
vs. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517; Beck vs. Jepp-
son, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P. 2d 760.) 
Furthermore, when the testimony is conflicting the 
appellate court will not disturb the findings of the trial 
court unless so manifestly erroneous as to demonstrate 
some oversight or mistake affecting the substantial rights 
of appellant. {Klopenstine vs. Hayes, 20 Utah 45, 57 
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Pac. 712; Singleton vs. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63, 
66; Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 Pac. 313; 
McMonegal vs. Fritsch Loan and Trust Co., 75 Utah 470, 
268 Pac. 635.) 
There is substantial evidence to sustain the fore-
going findings. I t was the duty of the trial court to 
resolve the conflict, and having resolved the conflict in 
defendant's favor, the rules cited above apply. 
I t is therefore the contention of defendant that 
under the law and facts of this case that plaintiff did 
not and could not acquire a prescriptive use of the 
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 for the 
reason that the proof shows they were either (a) waste 
or seepage water, or (b) surface water, or (c) percolat-
ing water, or a combination of same. The law denies 
that the use of such water may be obtained by prescrip-
tion, because such water is not "water" of the type, nature 
or kind subject to appropriation or prescriptive use. 
(B) In the alternative, if it be adjudged that the 
waters on defendant's land in Sees. 9 and 22 have been 
and are waters subject to the law of appropriation and 
prescription, then plaintiff did not and could not acquire 
a prescriptive use of same. 
In the event the Court refuses to adopt defendant's 
contention and theory above presented that the waters 
on defendant's land were not and are not subject to 
the law of appropriation and prescription and reaches 
the conclusion that they were and are waters subject 
to appropriation and prescriptive user, then defendant 
emphatically asserts that plaintiff, under the law of 
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Utah, could not and did not acquire a prescriptive right 
to use same. 
Neither plaintiff nor defendant has made any filing 
in the office of the State Engineer appropriating said 
waters and neither of them have actually diverted said 
waters from their natural collecting basins by means 
of ditches, canals or other structures. Under this hypo-
thesis the waters are public waters under the quoted 
Constitutional provision, statutes and decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This court faces two alternatives : 
(1) it must declare that these waters are not "water" 
under the water laws of Utah, but are waters of the 
type and kind described in Willow Creek and Crescent 
and not subject to appropriation or prescriptive user, 
or (2) it must declare these waters to be public waters 
owned by the public. There is no other choice. The argu-
ment which follows is submitted on the assumption (and 
without de-emphasizing defendant's first contention and 
line of defense) that the Court adopts the second alterna-
tive. 
Defendant, in this brief, has summarized the history 
of present Sec. 73-9-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, from the 
year 1903 to the present which is the vital and determin-
ing statutory enactment in this case. The original 1903 
statute effective May 11, 1903, during the passage of 
the years has been amended and re-written many times, 
but it has always retained either in form or substance 
this vital mandate: 
"Rights to the use of any of the unappropri-
ated water in the State may be acquired by ap-
propriation, in the manner hereinafter provided, 
and not otherwise" 
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As the cited decisions of the Utah Supreme Court 
disclose, this provision of law (and its amendments and 
amplifications) have been the subject of judicial con-
struction with resultant legislative amendments. How-
ever, one clear certain fact shines through all of the 
decisions (many of them involving complicated and com-
plex situations) and legislation, and that is that the 
use of unappropriated public waters since May 11, 1903, 
can be acquired only through the methods prescribed by 
the legislature "and not otherwise." As to these waters, 
the acquisition of same by prescription has been out-
lawed since May 11, 1903. 
The two decisions which announce this rule are 
Hooppiania and Hammond v. Johnson. There has never 
been any deviation from the rule pronounced by them 
and the rule therein laid down has been a fixed, un-
questioned rule in Utah since May 11, 1903. The contro-
versy which arose in connection with the interpretation 
of this statutory provision involved waters the use of 
which had passed from the public to private ownership 
and not as to waters which were "public" waters. The 
final form of the statute as it appears as Sec. 73-3-1, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, represents the legislative deter-
mination that even as to "private water" there can be 
no acquisition of use by prescription. All through the 
years the dispute has never involved the rule of Hoop-
piania and Hammond as applied to public waters, but 
always as to whether the statutory negation "and not 
otherwise" applied to waters the use of which had passed 
from the "public" to "private ownership." An examina-
tion and analysis of the cited decisions and of the many 
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authorities discussed and cited therein shows that the 
Supreme Court persistently made the distinction herein 
elucidated. It is in the cases where the use of water had 
passed to private ownership that the Court refused to 
apply what may be called the "not otherwise" rule 
governing public waters and engaged in discussions 
concerning the questions of abandonment, non-user, ad-
verse user, forfeiture, interruption in usage and the 
like questions. Lindsay graphically demonstrates the 
distinction. In that case the irrigation company had 
obtained a court decree fixing and determining the water 
rights in Little Bear River. Lindsay and its predecessor 
were not parties to the decree and continued to use 
water from the river not decreed to them. The contest 
was between private parties. Judge Larsen in Hammond 
pointed up the distinction in his declaration: 
"But neither abandonment nor forfeiture by 
non-user takes cognizance of or applies to a 
situation where a third party has entered the 
scene." (66 Pac. (2nd) at 900) 
Commencing with March 20, 1939, the Legislature ap-
plied the rule of Hooppiania and Hammond to private 
waters. If there has been and there is water on defend-
ant's said lands (an issue in this case) and the same 
is not waste or seepage water, surface or percolating 
water, then it always has been and is now "public water" 
within Hooppiania and Hammond. On this hypothesis, 
plaintiff never has acquired prescriptive use of same 
because of the prohibition of the statute effective from 
May 11, 1903, to the present date. If the date of filing 
plaintiff's cross-complaint (Jan. 6, 1956) be taken, then 
the elapsed time since May 11, 1903, is 52 years, 7 
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months and 25 days. If the date plaintiff commenced 
this action (May 31, 1955) be taken then the elapsed 
time is 52 years and 20 days. During all of this time 
the 1903 statute and its amendments and amplifications 
absolutely prohibited the plaintiff from acquiring the 
right to the use of the water by prescription. The findings 
of the jury is to the effect that plaintiff and his pre-
decessors in ownership used said water holes for 50 
consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955. Plaintiff and 
his predecessors therefore commenced to use said water 
on May 31, 1905, but at this time the 1903 statute was 
operative as to this water, and forbade the initiation 
of a period of prescriptive user. It is repeated that 
neither plaintiff nor defendant has applied to the State 
Engineer to appropriate said water, as mandated by 
statute if rights to use same were to be acquired, nor 
has any diversionary works been erected. 
It is interesting to note that plaintiff's witness, 
Pierre Castagne, is 50 years old (E. 246); that plaintiff's 
witness, Tony Castagno, is 53 years old (E. 293); that 
plaintiff's witness, Eose Castagno, fixed the years 1936-
1937 as the time she first "helped with live stock" in 
connection with the Cassity-Castagno land (E. 301, 302, 
303); that plaintiff's witness, Wanless, first worked for 
plaintiff and on his land in 1941 (E. 308). As to Pierre 
and Tony, manifestly their memories at the maximum 
cannot go back for more than 40 or 45 years. As to 
Eose, her testimony would encompass a period of 20 
years at the maximum. As to Wanless, 15 years only 
are within his memory. The plaintiff, himself, was vague 
and gave no date as to commencement of use of the 
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waters. He stated that "cattle drank at the holes as 
long as he can remember." (B. 65). Manifestly this testi-
mony does not prove any use prior to May 11, 1903 (B. 
89). I t is directed to the time subsequent to said date— 
all within the interdicted period. The jury 's finding 
that plaintiff and his predecessors used said water holes 
for 50 consecutive years prior to May 31, 1955, means 
exactly what it says. The underlying evidence would not 
support a finding of usage prior to May 31, 1905. 
Under this state of the law and the facts, defendant 
contends and submits that plaintiff obtained no prescrip-
tive right to use these waters. I t becomes entirely im-
material as to when the defendant's lands passed from 
ownership of the United States to private ownership. 
The doctrine of Sullivan v. Northern Spy Mining Co., 
supra, as recognized by the Act of Congress of July 26, 
1866 (43 U.S.C.A. 661) is to the effect that 
"To initiate and acquire a right in and to 
the use of unappropriated public water, whether 
on the public domain or within a reservation or 
elsewhere, is dependent upon the laws or customs 
of the state in which the water is found." (Sew-
ards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 Pac. 212) 
governs the situation as disclosed by the evidence in 
this case. Under the law of the State of Utah, plaintiff 
could acquire by prescription no rights in the water 
on defendant's land. 
With the disappearance of plaintiff's alleged rights 
in the water there also disappears any rights of ingress 
or egress for its enjoyment. Such implied easement 
must find its existence in the right to the water and 
when no right to the water exists there is no easement 
(Wendler v. Woodward, 93 Wash. 684; 161 Pac. 1043). 
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PART B 
ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S 
OF ERRORS IN ARGUMENTS 
LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION 
POINTS I AND II. It is respectfully submitted 
that Eespondent in Part A — Respondent's Argument 
and Demonstration of Validity of Judgment — has fully 
demonstrated the validity of the judgment in this case 
in his favor and has thereby shown to the Court that 
Appellant's arguments in support of these points in his 
brief are unsound and not supported by either the law 
or the facts in this case. It is believed that there is no 
necessity of further comment on these points. 
POINT III covers rulings of the trial Court in the 
exclusion of evidence. Each ruling will be treated separ-
ately. 
1. The excluded evidence pertained to a supposed 
right to trail cattle from an area marked on P Ex. I in 
pink bearing the figure "3" to the "old homestead" being 
shown on said exhibit in pink and marked with the figure 
"2." In none of Plaintiff's pleadings did he allege any 
such trail way easement. The basis of his claim for 
such easement related only to trailing cattle to and from 
Stansbury Island (R. 258, 259, 260, 263). Plaintiff's alle-
gations in paragraph 1 of his first separate defense 
(Record of Appeal, Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's 
cross claims) are definitely tied to the so-called Stans-
bury Island "trailway." The attempted production of 
this evidence at the trial was a surprise to Respondent 
as there was no warning pleading of any such claim. 
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The Court properly struck such evidence (R. 263). 
2. Appellant propounded this question to the Wit-
ness Pierre Castagno: 
"Do you have an opinion, Pierre, as to how 
the quantity of forage consumed and trampled 
down, by making this trail use of your brother 
(Respondent) would compare to the quantity of 
forage which his land about which you have just 
testified? (R. 269). 
In explanation of this question Appellant's counsel said: 
"I believe it shows he made use of these 
lands for the period which we are here involved 
with a certain number of head of cattle and a 
certain way. What I am trying to show is how 
that use compares to the total quantity of forage 
which is supported or produced by the lands, he, 
himself, owns within this very area." (R. 270). 
The "he" referred to in the explanation is the Respondent, 
Castagno (R. 270). The Court then asked: "Are you 
trying to compare damages now?" (R. 270). Appellant's 
counsel responded: "It would have that result, yes." 
(R. 270). The Court sustained Respondent's objection 
to this question. The ruling was proper as the answer 
of this witness to this question would in no sense bear 
on the question of damages accruing to the Respondent 
by virtue of the Appellant using Respondent's land as 
a trailway. The comparison between the amount of forage 
consumed by Appellant's cattle on Respondent's lands 
and the total amount the land would produce is not the 
correct measure of damages for the trespass (52 Am. Jur . 
—Trespass—Sec. 49, pp. 873-875). 
3. The excluded testimony pertained to an alleged 
conversation between Appellant and Appellant's deceased 
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father-in-law relative to the quantity and quality of 
water in the so-called "water holes" (R. 278, 279). The 
testimony was hear say. (Jones on Evidence (Ed. De 
Luxe) Sec. 297; Wigmore's Code of Evidence, Rule 147, 
P. 259). 
4. This action was tried in January, 1957. Appel-
lant's counsel propounded this question to Appellant: 
"Have you seen cattle watering in this dry year?" (Em-
phasis supplied). The answer was "Yes." The complaint 
in this action was filed on May 31, 1955. Upon motion 
of Respondent the Court struck Appellant's answer. 
Thereupon Appellant was asked by his counsel: "Is this 
as dry a year as during any of the years prior to 1955?" 
(R. 282). The witness answered: "Yes." He was then 
asked: "Is it drier?" Objection was sustained. The Court 
was correct in its ruling. The condition in 1957 — "This 
year" (which was subsequent to the commencement of 
the action) was not a proper reference base upon which 
to draw an inference as to prior conditions. 
5. The following excerpt applies to this alleged 
error: 
"Q. Do you know, Mr. Cassity, approxi-
mately when the homestead was filed by Mr. 
Castagno on the lands marked with a "numeral 
2?" 
"THE COURT: Hasn't that been stipulated? 
"MR. OMAN: As to the date the patent was 
issued, but not the date he filed it. 
"MR. RITER: That is immaterial, and I ob-
ject to it. 
"THE COURT: Do you object on the ground 
that it's not the best evidence ? 
"MR. RITER: Yes. 
"THE COURT: The objection is sustained." 
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I t requires no citation of authorities to show that Appel-
lant could not prove matters pertaining to the homestead 
application of Castagno by mere oral statements of 
Cassity as to date of filing of the homestead application 
by Castagno in the Federal General Land Office. No 
foundation was laid for the admission of this secondary 
evidence. If relevant and material to the issues in this 
case there was a way of proving such facts, but not by 
the method followed by Appellant in this instance. The 
best evidence rule clearly forbids such method of proof. 
There was no error. 
6. This alleged error in exclusion of evidence will 
be discussed hereafter in connection with the discussion 
of Point V of Appellant's brief. 
POINT IV. Through clerical error the Findings 
of Fact and the Judgment erroneously attributed to 
the Respondent ownership of the following land: 
NW14NE14; NEy 4 NWy 4 ; S W ^ N W ^ and Wy2-
SW%, Twp 2South, Range 5 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
This land in truth is owned by Appellant. The owner-
ship paragraph of Finding 3 and Paragraph 7 (A) of 
the Judgment should be corrected by eliminating said 
lands from an adjudication of Respondent's ownership. 
POINT V. Appellant asserts that a "promissory 
estoppel" exists as against Respondent as a justification 
of Appellant over running Respondent's land with cattle 
owned by Appellant. This claim is based on fragmentary 
evidence given by the Respondent on a Rule 43 (b) 
examination at the trial (R. 10, 11). Appellant's plead-
ings in this case raise no such issue. Neither in his 
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original complaint nor in his supplemental complaint 
did he make allegations that his alleged right to trail 
cattle over Kespondent's land was based on conduct 
of Eespondent which created an estoppel. 
"In pleading an estoppel in pais, the rule 
prevails that the plea must be certain in every 
particular, and must allege every material fact 
which the pleader expects to prove or upon which 
the estoppel is predicated. The estoppel must be 
pleaded with the same fullness and particularity 
as are required in cases involving like subjects of 
inquiry in suits in equity." 19 Am. Jur . Estoppel 
Sec. 193." (Am. Jur . Pleading and Practice Forms 
—Estoppel, Vol. 8, P . 181). 
Under this argument, estoppel — whether it be in pais 
or a so-called "promissory estoppel — is "an element 
ol the cause of action." I t must be pleaded. (Berow etal 
vs. Shields et ux, 48 Utah 270, 159 Pac. 538; Barber vs. 
Anderson, 73 Utah, 375 274 Pac. 136; Annotation 120 
ALR 105). Respondent again invites the Court's atten-
tion to the fact that Appellant's case, as based on his 
pleadings, is based solely on the claim of prescriptive 
user. The trial court properly struck the evidence relating 
to an alleged transaction pertaining to the "homestead" 
land of Respondent (R. 11) in view of the state of the 
pleadings. However, it should be noted that Appellant's 
counsel did not at the time of the trial claim it supported 
the claim of an estoppel. He asserted "* * * but now he 
(Castagno) has refused to sell that out, because of things 
which have transpired between the parties here, and 
he has come to interfere with this operation of Cassity. 
I claim that actually—." For the foregoing reason, the 
Court was correct in striking the evidence pertaining 
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to an alleged agreement of the Respondent to sell Appel-
lant the "homestead" land (R. 10, 11). (See also Point 
II , 5 of Appellant's brief at page 28), and in not allowing 
Appellant's counsel to pursue such line of questioning. 
I t will be noted that Respondent acted promptly to 
eliminate testimony on this point as soon as it became 
apparent the purpose thereof (R. 10,11). 
CONCLUSION 
The vein of thought runs through Appellant's brief 
that his claimed necessity of using Respondent's land 
for the operation of his live stock business, gives him 
some kind of legal right to subordinate it to his use and 
convenience regardless of the rights of Respondent. 
The judgment in this case denies such philosophy. It 
upholds the doctrine that each man should use his own 
property in such manner as not to injure his neighbor. 
The judgment should be affirmed, except to the cor-
rection of the clerical error above noted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER 
Attorney for Respondent 
Suite 312 Kearns Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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was the same and the same reasons 
e given for desiring the severance. 
; situation here is analogous to the ex-
ple given in the Restatement of the Law 
Judgments, Sec. 61, Comment c, where 
is pointed out that where there have 
n two batteries by and against the same 
son at different times the principle of 
judicata does not apply because the 
nsactions are different "even though un-
• the pleadings in the first action evi-
lce as to the second battery would have 
:n admissible and would have sustained 
: first action." 
^4] Although the court in the prior ac-
n had found from the evidence presented 
it that justice and equity required a 
rerance and in the ordinary case where 
judgment has been granted on issues 
lich have been litigated between the same 
rties such issues under the doctrine of 
[lateral estoppel 3 cannot be relitigated in 
subsequent but different cause of action, 
is doctrine does not apply here because 
at doctrine does not have any bearing on 
e question here presented. That doc-
ine only applies where a question of fact 
sential to and determinative of the judg-
ent is actually litigated and determined 
r
 a valid or final judgment which is con-
usive as between the parties to a subse-
ient action on a different cause of action. 
ince this action is based on a new and ' 
fferent ordinance which necessarily re-
lires the determination of essentially dif-
:rent facts from those determined in the 
-evious action that doctrine can have no 
^plication to this case. 
Another and controlling reason why re-
)ondent's position cannot be sustained is 
lat in the former action the court severed 
le land from the city, but if we were to 
[firm the trial court's decision that ap-
ellants cannot maintain this action, the 
ffect would be to overrule the previous 
ecision and hold that appellants may not 
ow assert the rights therein granted them. 
In other words, the effect which respond-
ent claims for the previous decision in 
this case is that the city may take ac-
tions which completely nullify the sever-
ance decreed in that action, but because 
there was a former action appellants are 
forever barred from contesting the annex-
ation of their property to the city because 
the court in the previous action determined 
similar issues in their favor. Such de-
cision not being adverse to appellants' 
claim in this action does not have the ef-
fect of preventing them from maintaining 
this action. Such a holding would have 
the effect of reversing the decision which 
is now claimed to be determinative of this 
case. This strange result clearly demon-
strates that the issues are different in the 
two cases. 
Reversed. Parties to bear their own 
costs. 
McDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
WORTHEN and HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
( o I KEY NUMBER!SYSTEM^ I * 
Joseph Lavern BOYER, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
Clifford CLARK, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 8681. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 23, 1958. 
1
 i 
Action to have a road declared a public 
highway and to restrain defendant from in-
terfering with travel by the public and for 
damages. From a judgment of the Third 
District Court, Summit County, Charles G. 
Cowley, J., in favor of defendant, the plain-
tiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
J., held that evidence that for a period ex-
ceeding 50 years, the public, even though 
noj consisting of a great many persons, 
because comparatively few people had 
need to travel over it, made a continuous 
and uninterrupted use of wagon trail in 
'raveling by wagon and other vehicles and 
by horse as often as they found it conven-
ient or necessary, and that they trailed 
:attle and sheep, hauled coal, and used such 
;rail for other purposes in traveling from 
Srass Creek and various other points to and 
"rom highway was sufficient as matter of 
aw to establish a highway by dedication. 
Reversed with instructions. 
dedication <§^37 
Evidence that for a period exceeding 
•0 years, the public, even though not con-
isting of a great many persons, "because 
omparatively few people had need to travel 
iver it, made a continuous and uninterrupt-
d use of wagon trail in traveling by wagon 
nd other vehicles and by horse as often 
s they found it convenient or necessary, 
nd that they trailed cattle and sheep, 
auled coal, and used such trail for other 
urposes in traveling from Grass Creek and 
arious other points to and from highway 
ras sufficient as matter of law to establish 
highway by dedication. U.S.C.A. 1953, 
7-1-3.1 
Boyden, Tibbals, Staten & Croft, Salt 
ake City, for appellant. 
Fowler & Matheson, Salt Lake City, for 
ispondent. 
WADE, Justice. 
This action was commenced by Joseph 
avern Boyer to have Middle Canyon Road 
blared a public highway, to restrain re-
londent, Clifford Clark, from interfering 
ith travel by the public and for damages, 
his appeal is from a judgment adverse to 
)pellant. 
The road in question is a wagon trail 
which runs in a northerly direction up Mid-
dle Canyon and over a ridge into Grass 
Creek from S.tate Highway 133, which goes 
easterly up Chalk Creek Canyon from Coal-
ville to Upton, Utah and beyond. The junc-
tion of this wagon trail with State Highway 
No. 133 is in Section 33 on respondent's 
property over which it traverses from 750 
to 1500 feet to the north half of Section 33 
and from there over the north half of that 
section on land owned by one Erconbrack 
into Section 28 belonging to appellant. It 
also continues to the north across Section 21 
before Grass Creek is reached. It was a 
part of the public domain until title passed 
from the Government to the Union Pacific 
Railroad Company to which patent issued 
in 1902. 
The undisputed testimony of James H. 
Judd who was about 84 years old at the time 
of the trial in 1956 was that his home had 
been in Upton when he was 8 or 10 years 
old when he first became acquainted with 
Middle Canyon Road while helping his 
father haul coal from mines in Grass Creek. 
He also testified that he had used the road 
for over 50 years when hauling coal, cross-
ing the open range, driving cattle, sheep and 
courting the girl he later married in Grass 
Creek. He further testified that anyone 
who wanted to, used the road to haul coal, 
drive sheep and cattle or ride horses or 
wagons over it. There was also testimony 
of a number of other witnesses that the use 
of the road, was not changed after patent 
w,as issued and anyone who wanted to use it 
to go deer hunting or visiting with people 
living in the vicinity or to dances which 
were held in Grass Creek did so, as well as 
those who used it to trail sheep or cattle. 
No one testified that prior to the time re-
spondent acquired the property in question 
permission was asked or obtained from any 
owner to traverse the trail. The use of the 
road was not great because comparatively 
few people had need to travel over it, but 
those of the public who had such need, did 
so. Within the past few years prior to the 
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Cite as 326 
1 of this action in 1956, both appellant 
respondent have put no trespassing 
is on their properties and have attempted 
:harge deer hunters who wanted to use 
ir properties. However, no objection 
5 made nor did any of the owners of 
perty over which the trail traversed 
smpt to interfere in the public's use until 
pondent tried to prevent such use a short 
te before this action was commenced. 
spondent became the owner of the land in 
istion approximately 12 years before the 
nmencement of this action. He testified 
it since he has become acquainted with 
i trail, it does not extend to Grass Creek, 
t ends somewhere up Middle Canyon. 
ddle Canyon Road has never been main-
ned at public expense. 
The court as the trier of the facts found 
at appellant "had failed to produce suffi-
mt evidence to establish a public high-
1V * *. *» 
In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. 
lurnos, 75 Utah 384, 285 P. 646, 648, this 
>urt pointed out that Congress in 1866 
lacted Section 2477, Revised Statutes of 
e United States (43 U.S.C.A. § 932) 
herein it granted the right of way for 
iblic highways over public lands not re-
irved for public uses, and that an accept-
nce of such grant could be made "by public 
se without formal action by public author-
ies, and that continued use of the road 
y the public for such length of time and 
nder such circumstances as to clearly in-
icate an intention on the part of the public 
3 accept the grant is sufficient." We fur-
her pointed out that under our territorial 
aws a continuous and uninterrupted use of 
i road by the public for a period of 10 years 
vas sufficient to create a public highway 
>y use, and where the evidence showed that 
'while the lands traversed by the road were 
)ublic lands of the United States the road 
vas used as a public thoroughfare'' for a 
period exceeding that required by our stat-
utes for creating a public highway by use, 
such evidence "is sufficient in law to amount 
P.2d 107 
of the right of way over the public lands, 
and thus would constitute and create the 
road in question a public highway by dedi-
cation." See also Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 
101 Utah 1, 116 P.2d 420, 423. 
The uncontradicted evidence in the in-
stant case disclosed that for a period ex-
ceeding 50 years, the public, even though 
not consisting of a great many persons, 
made a continuous and uninterrupted use 
of Middle Canyon Road in traveling by 
wagon and other vehicles and by horse from 
Upton to Grass Creek and other points as 
often as they found it convenient or nec-
essary. They trailed cattle, and sheep, 
hauled coal, and used this trail for other 
purposes in traveling from Grass Creek and 
various other points to and from Highway 
133. This evidence was sufficient as a 
matter of law to establish a highway by 
dedication and the court erred in finding 
otherwise. The highway once having been 
established by such use, it is provided by 
statute, Sec. 27-1-3, U.C.A.1953, that it 
" * * * must continue to be highway (s) 
until abandoned by order of the board of 
county commissioners' * ' * * or -other 
competent authority." * There is no con-
tention that any such procedure has been 
invoked here. 
Due to the fact that the trial court did 
not find it was a public highway, it fail-
ed to find on two further issues dependent 
upon such fact, which it will be necessary 
to determine upon remand: (1) the width 
of the highway, which must be determined 
in accordance with what is reasonable and 
necessary for the uses to which the road has 
been put; (2) any damages proximately 
resulting to the plaintiff by the wrongful 
conduct of the defendant in closing and 
excluding him from the roadway. 
Reversed, with instructions to proceed 
in accordance with this opinion. Costs to 
plaintiff. 
McDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
T T r ^ n ^ T j u M „ „ A TTFNT?TOD TT'..'concur. 
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Clayton FREYTAG, Orva Miller, Meldrum 
M. Rinearson and Candace Rinearson, 
Appellants, 
v. 
Adeline VITAS, Executrix of the Estate of 
John Vitas, deceased, Defendant, 
Adeline Vitas, unmarried, John K. Vitas, un-
married, Nick Vitas, unmarried, 
Appellants, 
Jack Houston, Leona Vinson, Defendants, 
State of Oregon, Respondent, 
and 
J . D. Mitchell, Intervenor-Appellant. 
Supreme Court of Oregon, 
Department 2. 
Argued a i^d Submitted Jan. 8, 1958. 
Decided May 28, 1958. 
Suit to quiet title to gravel bar in 
Willamette River. The Circuit Court, 
lackamas County, Ralph M. Holman, J., 
ntered a decree holding title to be in de-
mdant, and appeals were taken. The 
upreme Court, Warner, J., held that 
ridence would not sustain plaintiffs' con-
ntion that land involved had not be^ en 
l island at low water during effective 
iriod of statute relinquishing state's title 
• all lands on Willamette River lying 
:tween high and low water marks. 
Affirmed. 
Quieting Title <^I0(I) 
In suit to quiet title to real property, 
lintiff must recover on strength of his 
m title and not on weakness of his ad-
rsary's title. 
Quieting Title <©==>44(l) 
In suit to quiet title to real property, 
rden is on plaintiff to establish that he 
s a perfect legal or equitable title, 
^ardless of status of defendant's title. 
Quieting Title <& 4^4(l) 
When pleadings in quiet title suit 
ce title in issue, plaintiff has burden 
superior to that of defendant; but when 
each party claims to be owner, burden 
is upon each adverse claimant to make 
good his affirmative averments by evi-
dence touching his own title to property. 
4. Navigable Waters <§=>42(l) 
In suit to quiet title to gravel bar in 
Willamette River, evidence would not sus-
tain plaintiffs' contention that land in-
volved had not been an island at low water 
during effective period of statute relin-
quishing state's title to all lands on Willa-
mette River lying between high and low-
water marks. ORS 41.310, 41.360(32); 
Laws 1874, p. 76; Laws 1878, pp. 54, 55. 
5. New Trial <&*2 
The statute authorizing granting of 
new trials applies only to law actions and 
not to suits in equity. ORS 17.610(4). 
6. Judgment <&=>342(l) 
After expiration of term, circuit court 
had no jurisdiction to vacate its decree 
in quiet title suit unless it appeared from 
record that it had been without jurisdic-
tion to render judgment; its authority 
. after term time being limited to correction 
of clerical or formal errors. 
7. New Trial <§^ >99 
Newly discovered evidence is ground 
for new trial in actions of law but has 
no application to suits in equity. 
John C. Caldwell, Oregon City, for 
appellants. On the briefs were Beattie, 
Hibbard & Caldwell, Oregon City, George 
D. LaRoche and White, Sutherland & 
Parks, Portland. 
Lloyd G. Hammel, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
respondent. With him on the brief was 
Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen. 
Before PERRY, C. J., and LUSK, 
WARNER and KESTER *, JJ. 
WARNER, Justice. 
This is a suit to quiet title to a gravel Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
p_injriigr^sijyere entitled tcrthe full use 
& •enjoyment of the land. The State of 
taji^daimsjao^inte^ 
ifajssje,rt&4iojiter r testj4^rill2Jl!S )<§iate ' 
q provision of the Enabling Act or of 
e ConsHtution7" "wTiicn provide that the 
•oceeds from the sale of such lands shall 
institute a trust fund is in any manner 
lpinged—even by indirection—by uphold-
g plaintiff's title. It is difficult to see how 
ider such circumstances the defendants 
>uld claim that their failure to demand 
le issuance of patent or the state's delay 
L issuing it could defeat plaintiff's claim 
• title by adverse possession by the bald 
ssertion that such possession was adverse 
> the state. The trial court did not err 
i rejecting such contention. 
The judgment below is therefore affirnv 
1 Costs to respondent. 
CROCKETT, WADE, WORTHEN, and 
[ENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
(p | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
AUTO LEASE COMPANY, a partnership, ^ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CENTRAL MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., a 
corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
No. 8746. 
Supreme Court of Utalu 
May 13, 19S8. 
Action by insured on policy to recover 
ror damage to automobile which it had pur-
chased and which had been damaged while 
*eing transported. The Third Judicial Dis-
xict Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M. 
Sanson, J., rendered judgment for insurer 
ind insured appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that under policy insuring 
ive of insured's automobiles and providing 
that, if insured acquired ownersnip oi 
another automobile and so notified com-
pany within 30 days following delivery, 
policy applied to such automobile as of date 
of such acquisition, if such automobile re-
placed an automobile described in policy, 
insured was not entitled to recover for loss 
of automobile which was intended to re-
place another automobile but which was lost 
during delivery while automobile to be re-
placed was still in service. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <§=>I78 
Motion for summary judgment is in 
effect a demurrer to contentions of adverse 
party and states that, conceding facts to be 
as claimed by adversary, there is no basis 
for recovery. A 
2. Appeal and Error ®=^934(l) 
On appeal, all aspects of case are con-
sidered in light most favorable to party 
against whom motion for summary judg-
ment was granted.1 
3. Insurance <§=* 146(3) 
Rule that in case of uncertainty or am-
biguity language of policy should be con-
strued most strongly against insurer be-
cause it drew and issued policy has no ap-
plication unless there is some genuine am-
biguity or uncertainty in language upon 
which reasonable minds may differ as to 
the meaning, and that requirement is not 
satisfied because a party may get a different 
meaning by placing a forced or strained 
construction on language.2 
4. Insurance <§=*I46(3) 
Test to be applied in determining 
whether there is an ambiguity in language 
of insurance policy is whether meaning 
would be plain to a person of ordinary intel-
ligence and understanding, viewing matter 
fairly and reasonably, in accordance with 
the usual and natural meaning of the words, 
and in light of existing circumstances, in-
cluding purpose of the policy, and if it 
would be rule that ambiguity will be con-
w ™ ™ ^ Tvrntai 123 Utah 2. Huber & Roland Const. Co. v. South 
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)oses for which they have been granted. 
Counsel for respondent has no quarrel with 
he contention that the state may not dispose 
>f lands which were the subject of the re-
nted grant in violation of the trust thereby 
mposed, nor with the proposition that a 
>ossessor may not hold adversely to the 
tate with respect to such lands. Respond-
nt's contention is that under the facts of 
tiis case no such issue is confronted. 
In support of their position appellants rely 
eavily upon certain Utah cases. Among 
lem is the case of Van Wagoner v. Whit-
lore, 58 Utah 418, 199 P. 670, which it is 
Dntended is determinative of the present 
ise. We are not in accord with this con-
mtion. 
In the Van Wagoner case, one Whitmore 
ad been in open, notorious occupancy and 
^ssession of the land in question, which 
nds were subject to the same limitations 
l alienability by the state as that here in-
)lved, since long prior to the date on which 
e state of Utah was admitted to the Un-
n. He had enclosed the lands with a 
nee and made other improvements. At 
e time of the admission of the state of 
tah to the Union it was provided by law 
at one who was in possession of land 
en given to the state by the Federal Gov-
nment as grants in aid of schools could 
ike application and exercise preference 
^hts for acquisition of title. Whitmore 
i not pursue this remedy. In 1912 one 
m Wagoner entered into an agreement 
purchase said lands from the state of 
ah and was issued a certificate of sale. 
tent was issued to him in June, 1916. 
icreafter he commenced an action in 
ictment against Whitmore, who by an-
er claimed title to the lands by adverse 
"Actions by the state.—The state will 
not sue any person for or in respect to 
any real property, or the issues or profits 
thereof, by reason of the right or title 
of the state to the same, unless: 
"(1) Such right or title shall have ac-
crued within seven years before any ac-
tion or other proceeding for the same 
shall be commenced; or, 
possession. It is quite evident from the 
statement of the facts that the adverse pos-
session of Whitmore as against Van Wag-
oner did not commence until after the cer-
tificate of sale was issued in 1912. The 
suit in ejectment was commenced early in 
1918. Consequently the requisite period 
of time, seven years, had not expired at the 
time of the commencement of the action. 
The question involved, therefore, was 
whether or not Whitmore could hold ad-
versely to the state of Utah. And that is 
the sole question discussed in the opinion 
of the court on that particular phase of the 
case. The interest of the state in the land 
was asserted by a complaint in intervention 
by the state. Its contention and that of the 
plaintiff was upheld by this court, such con-
tention being that the predecessor section 
to Section 78-12-2, U.C.A.1953 * could not 
be applied against the state insofar as the 
class of lands involved was concerned. It 
was not a holding, as contended by appel-
lant, to the effect that the statute of limita-
tions could not run against a purchaser 
from the state until after the issuance of 
patent. 
We have examined the other Utah cases 
cited by the appellants in support of their 
position.2 It would unduly extend this opin-
ion to enter into a discussion of them. Suf-
fice i t jQ say that none of the cases involve 
a
^iiillfliPn fiUrb-a<i w p h^ r p confront: that 
during all of the time while the plaintiff 
was in possession of the premises in ques-
tion and l o r many years pr ior the te to Ihe, 
state, of Utah held the bare legal title,. j u -
nal payment_ofjhe amount_due the state had 
that time the defendants or their predeces-
and profits of such real property, or 
some part thereof, within seven years." 
2. Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah 64; Toltec 
Ranch v. Babcock, 24 Utah 183; Young 
v. Corless, 56 Utah 564, 191 P. 647; 
Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 47 Utah 
165, 152 P. 178; Livingston v. Thornley, 
74 Utah 516, 280 P. 1042. 
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ad executed and delivered an assignment 
nd transfer of his interest in the land in 
uestion. As noted above such assignment 
nd transfer was not recorded in Beaver 
bounty. Under the writ of execution the 
heriff of Beaver County sold at Sheriff's 
>ale the interest of Lewis in the real estate 
[escribed in the Land Board certificate. 
The sheriff's certificate of sale was issued 
o Holmes on March 28, 1914. No redemp-
ion from such execution sale was ever 
nade. The sheriff's certificate of sale of 
"eal estate on execution was placed on rec-
ord in the office of the Beaver County Re-
order on about the date of its execution, 
^rom 1918 to 1940 the lands were, pursu-
mt to statute, assessed in the name of the 
*ecord owner, namely Gus S. Holmes. 
Taxes assessed against the lands were not 
3aid and they were sold to Beaver County 
for nonpayment of taxes on January 2, 
[937. Thereafter Beaver County foreclosed 
its tax lien, and upon entry of a default 
judgment sheriff's deed on foreclosure sale 
was issued to Beaver County in 1941. 
Plaintiff purchased said property from 
Beaver County on contract approved June 
5, 1941. Final payment was made on De-
cember 11, 1945. Ever since June 5, 1941, 
the plaintiff has been in exclusive, open, 
continuous, uninterrupted and adverse pos-
session and occupancy of all of the said real 
property under claim of right and title 
thereto, and has paid all the taxes regularly 
levied and assessed thereon according to 
law. The defendants or their predecessors 
in title have never at any time been seiied 
or in possession of any part of lands in 
controversy herein, nor received any part 
of the rents, issues or profits from said 
lands. 
The lower court held that by reason of 
the purchase from Beaver County and by 
reason of plaintiff's adverse possession and 
occupancy of the land and payment of all 
taxes regularly levied and assessed thereon 
for more than seven years subsequent to 
the final payment to the state of Utah on the 
contract to purchase from the state and 
title to the lands in question as against each 
and all of the defendants. A decree was 
entered accordingly and the state of Utah 
was directed to issue patent to the said 
lands to plaintiff. It should be mentioned 
at this point that the state of Utah was 
joined as a party defendant in the quiet 
title action of the plaintiff, and the Attorney % 
General on behalf of the state of Utah an-
swered that on March 30, 1914, the state 
of Utah received final payment for the pur-
chase of the land, and therefore the state 
of Utah disclaimed any right, title or inter-
 t 
est therein and stated that it stands ready, 
willing and able to issue a patent to such 
lands in accordance with the judgment of 
the court. 
In answering in the negative the que 
tion posed at the outset of this opinion, tl 
position of appellant may be stated as fo; 
lows: The State Agricultural School lands 
granted to the state by the federal govern-
ment are held by the state in trust for the 
people to be disposed of as may be provided 
by law and relinquishment of title by the 
state otherwise than by way of a sale and 
issuance of patent to a person other than a 
purchaser, his assignee or successor in in- f 
terest, is unconstitutional and void and in 
contravention of the enabling act, the Utah 
State Constitution and the statutes pertain-
ing to the administration, management and 
sale of state lands. Counsel refers in sup-
port of his contention to the provisions of 
the enabling act, approved July 16, 1894, 28 
Stat. 107, which provides that the grant 
here involved is for the use of an agricul-
tural college and subject to the restriction 
that all proceeds from the sale of said lands 
are to constitute a permanent fund to be 
safely invested and held by the state with 
the income thereof to be used exclusively 
for the purposes of such college. Likewise 
invoked are the provisions of Sections 3 to 
7 inclusive of Article X, Sec. 3 of Article 
XIII and Sec. 1 of Article XX of the Con-
stitution of Utah, pursuant to the provisions 
of which all lands granted to the state by 
congress are declared to be held in trust Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i land, and statutory and constitutional 
rovisions that proceeds for sale of land 
sued constitute a trust fund for colleges 
ere not in any manner impinged by up-
>lding plaintiff's title. 
Affirmed. 
Averse Possession <§^7(3) 
Failure of purchaser from state of 
nd, which had been granted by federal 
>vernment to state for use of agricultur-
college, and his successors in interest to 
:mand issuance of patent or state's delay 
issuing patent could not defeat claim-
Lt's title to land by adverse possession 
here state had received payment of pur-
ase price long before claimant's entry, 
ite claimed no interest in land, and stat-
ory and constitutional provisions that pro-
eds for sale of land issued constitute a 
ist fund for colleges were not in any 
inner impinged by upholding claimant's 
le. Const, art. 10, §§ 3-7; art. 13, § 3 ; 
t. 20, § 1; U.C.A.1953, § 7&-12-2.1 
John S. Boyden, Allen H. Tibbals, Salt 
.ke City, for appellants. 
C. M. Gilmour, Clinton D. Vernon, Salt 
ke City, for respondent. 
MCDONOUGH, chief justice. 
The first question here confronted, the 
swer to which we deem decisive of this 
peal, may be stated as follows: Where 
ids were granted to the state by the fed-
L1 government for use of the State Agri-
tural College and subject to the restric-
ri that all proceeds from the sale of said 
ds are to constitute a permanent fund 
be safely invested and held by the state, 
: income thereof to be used exclusively 
• the purposes of such college; and where 
tain of said lands were sold in the man-
• provided by law to a purchaser who 
reafter paid to the state the full pur-
Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 
118, 199 P. 670; Steele v. Boley, 7 Utah 
chase price thereof, and was therefore en-
titled to a patent from the state, may a third 
party by holding the land adversely to the 
successors in interest of the purchaser for 
the requisite period subsequent to the date 
of final payment, but before issuance of 
patent, quiet title thereto as against such 
successors in interest of the purchaser? 
The facts out of which this controversy 
arises are these: The state of Utah was 
granted by law the right to select certain 
federal lands as grants in aid of the Agri-
cultural College and to sell the land so 
acquired. One Joseph Henshaw signed an 
agreement to purchase selected lands on the 
24th of November, 1902. The lands he 
agreed to buy are the ones here in contro-
versy. After approval by the United States 
Land Office the state on January 1, 1905, 
issued to Henshaw certificate of sale No. 
8515. 
Henshaw died in 1905 but prior to his 
death he had assigned and transferred the 
certificate of sale interest to one A. B. 
Lewis. In ,1910, Lewis assigned and trans-
ferred the certificate to Lewisiana Land 
Company, which company assigned and 
transferred the certificate on August 21, 
1914, to William Story, Jr., and Frederick 
Steigmeyer, a co-partnership. Neither of 
these assignments were recorded in the 
Office of the County Recorder of Beaver 
County, where the land is located. Ap-
pellants are the assignees and successors 
in interest of the co-partnership. On March 
30, 1914, the state of Utah received'the Jmal 
p a r e n t s constituting payment in M L i p 
t n ? . stajte^rTTtaE' of the sum due on_the 
purchase of the land under the certificatejai. 
One Gus S. Holmes, having acquired a 
money judgment in Salt Lake County 
against Lewis, procured to be issued a writ 
of execution on March 4, 1914. This, it 
will be noted, was several years after Lewis 
P. 647; Utah Copper Co. v. Eckman, 
47 Utah 165, 152 P. 178; Livingston v. 
sale. No patent to said lands ha&^^xJie^n.. 
issued by the state of Utah. _ 
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' of the other defendants is based on 
. supplying Suhrmann with this prod-
There may be a sharp conflict in the 
ence as to such facts. 
] The order complained of was made 
notion of1 plaintiffs and opposed by the 
mdants who initiated the intermediate 
sal. Appellants contend (1) that such 
solidation is contrary to the Constitu-
k and statutory provisions of this State, 
(2) that it would be highly prejudicial 
iefendants. We conclude that the trial 
rt's order was neither erroneous nor 
reach of its discretion. 
before considering defendants' claims 
call attention to Rule 42 of Utah Rules 
Civil Procedure. Subdivision (a) there-
expressly authorizes the trial court to 
ier a joint hearing of common questions 
law or fact arising from different ac-
>ns and to order such proceedings as 
a.y tend to avoid unnecessary costs or 
lay. Subdivision (b) authorizes the trial 
•urt in furtherance of convenience or to 
roid prejudice to order a separate trial 
E any separate issue or any number of 
sues. So, unless the trial court's order is 
Dntrary to the Constitution or statutes of 
lis State, or is likely to be prejudicial 
D defendants, it was clearly within the dis-
retion of the trial court to order a con-
olidation for trial of the issue of lia-
)ility in all of these cases. 
(1) This order does not violate any con-
stitutional or statutory provision. To sup-
port their contention contrary to this 
statement defendants rely on Article I, 
Section 7 of our Constitution that no "per-
son shall be deprived of * * * property, 
without due process of law"; also Article 
I, Section 10, providing: 
"In capital cases the right of trial 
by jury shall remain inviolate. In 
courts of general jurisdiction, except 
in capital cases, a jury shall consist of 
eight jurors. In courts of inferior 
jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four 
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict 
a verdict. A jury m u v u ^ ~ _ _ 
be waived unless demanded." 
From the details therein provided counsel 
concludes that the legislature has no power 
to change those provisions. We do not 
disagree with this conclusion but we find 
nothing in either Section 7 or 10 which is 
not in complete harmony with the trial 
court's order. 
Counsel then refers to Section 78-21-1, 
U.C.A.1953, as follows: 
"In actions for the recovery of spe-
cific real or personal property, with 
or without damages, or for money 
claimed as due upon contract or as 
damages for breach of contract, or 
for injuries, an issue of fact may be 
tried by a jury, unless a jury trial is 
waived or a reference is ordered." 
and Section 78-21-2, U.C.A.1953, as fol-
lows: 
u
 All questions of fact, where the 
trial is by jury, other than those men-
tioned in the next section, are to be 
decided by the jury, and all evidence 
thereon is to be addressed to them, 
except when otherwise provided." 
(Italics taken from appellants' brief.) 
[2] Counsel claims that this statute, 
since it uses the term "the jury," means 
that one and the same jury must try all 
issues in the case. This is obviously a 
strained construction of that language. 
That language simply means that all ques-
tions of fact are to be decided by the jury 
impaneled to try such issues. It does not 
consider or determine the question of 
whether more than one jury may try dif-
ferent issues in a case. So, we conclude 
that neither the Constitution nor these 
statutes have any bearing on whether the 
same jury must decide all issues of fact 
in a given case.
 s 
(2) We are also unable to see that the 
consolidation of these cases for determina-
tion of liability only by one jury will be 
prejudicial to the defendants. Certainly 
a single determination of the question of 
liability will tend to save time and expense 
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.wxx u^. a sudip connict 
in the evidence on the facts which will be 
determinative of liability. 
Defendants' claim, that the consolidation 
of the cases to determine liability only 
will be prejudicial, is based on two propo-
sitions: (1) They claim that a jury which 
determines liability only without assess-
ing specific amounts of damages is more apt 
to decide that question against them than 
would a jury charged with a determination 
of the amount of damages. (2) They claim 
that if the same jury determines liability 
and the amount of damages, the amount 
of damages would probably be greatly re-
duced. 
We see no reason why a jury which de-
termines only the question of liability would 
be more apt to determine that question 
against the defendants or either of them 
than would a jury which also determined 
the amount of damages. In fact, it is 
sometimes claimed that a showing that 
damages have been sustained appeals to 
the emotions of the jury and causes little 
or no consideration of the facts which 
create liability. In such case a jury which 
determines liability only would more care-
fully consider the facts on which such lia-
)ility is claimed than would a jury charged 
vith assessing the amount of damages also. 
The claim that a jury which heard all 
he evidence on liability and damages would ^  
e likely to reduce the amount of damages 
> only well founded where a serious doubt 
f liability causes a compromise verdict 
n the amount of damages. Of course, the 
sfendants are not entitled to. the benefit 
I such a compromise verdict. They are 
lly entitled to a separate fair considera-
)n of the issues of fact which are deter-
inative of the question of liability and 
e amount of damages. In either event 
; cannot see that either plaintiffs or de-
idants will be prejudiced by the order of 
nsolidatiQn made by the trial court. 
Drder of the trial court is afrjrmed. 
s.ts to respondents.
 i?t 
^cDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
I concur, but make the following obser 
vation. The consolidation to determine lia 
bility which was ordered at pre-trial, s< 
far as I can determine from the record 
was without any motion therefor having 
been made by any of the parties. The 
consolidation to determine liability nc 
doubt was made to expedite matters and 
save expense. I am wondering if expedi-
tion and saving of expense would not be 
accomplished further if consolidation were 
ordered to determine not only liability but 
to determine damages, if liability were es-
tablished. In such event, one jury could 
handle all matters and it would save a 
great deal of time and expense in im-
panelling eleven new and different juries. 
MINERSVILLE LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Earl P. STATEN, Administrator of the Es-
tate of William Story, Jr., deceased, et 
,
 v 31., Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 8662. 
w ' 0 \ |*Supreme Court 
Y \ r May 14, 1 
of Utah. 
958. 
Action to quiet title to land and for 
order directing state to issue patent to land. 
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaver 
County, Will L. Hoyt, J., rendered judg-
ment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed. 
The Supreme Court, McDonough, C. J., 
held that failure of purchaser of land which 
had been granted by federal government to ' • 
state for use of agricultural college, and his 
successors in interest to demand issuance ••/ 
of patent or state's delay in issuing patent 
could not defeat plaintiff's title to land by 
adverse possession where state had received 
payment of purchase price Inna u~f~-~ Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
